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Marsilio Ficino (1433 to 1499) was the first Renaissance philosopher to have access to the full 
Platonic corpus.  He desired to use these ancient writings, plus faith, scripture, and reason to reunite 
religion and philosophy into one mutually supportive system, and was perhaps motivated to do so by 
circumstances arising from the era in which he worked, his life, context and writing style.  His 
background and motivations are reviewed, followed by an examination of his philosophical 
arguments about God‘s five main attributes: existence, simplicity, goodness, omniscience, and 
omnipotence.  Finally the divine/human relationship is examined using the uniqueness of the divine‘s 
relationship with humans, divine illumination, hierarchies and love.  This assessment of the Godly 
attributes and the divine/human relationship finds that, although Ficino did use Platonic ideas that 
were new to the Renaissance period, his failure to construct strong philosophical arguments made his 
work ultimately less enduring than that of his contemporaries.  My transcription of the 1495 edition of 
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Marsilio Ficino, who lived from 1433 to 1499, was the epitome of a Renaissance man: a doctor, 
scholar (tutor, translator, and author), philosopher, musician, astrologer, and Christian priest.  In his 
written works he hoped to weave together reason and faith to demonstrate that each informs and 
supports the other and that the two should be reunited. 
The first chapter of this thesis sets Ficino in context.  The first section examines the historical and 
political context in which Ficino lived.  Three generations of the Medici family and their relationships 
with Ficino are reviewed.  The second section is a Ficinian biography covering how Ficino was 
introduced to the Medici and some of Corsi‘s comments about Ficino‘s personality.  Ficino‘s 
progression from translator to priest is outlined and his patrons and sources of income are 
summarized.  The section 1.3 briefly covers the intellectual context in which Ficino worked, with 
particular attention paid to humanism.  The next section covers the sequence of works produced by 
Ficino and includes a listing of known works with the timeframe in which they were written and 
publication dates (if known).  Section 1.5 is the final section in the first chapter and it contains an 
examination of Ficino‘s writing style.  Ficino often wrote in a style that was metaphorical and 
allegorical.  It was also the mindset of his time that everything was related, so science, literature, art, 
medicine, philosophy and religion were seen as components of a unity.  He liked to find the 
connections and similarities between things so his works are often very syncretic in nature.  Fifteenth 
century Florence did not have the same academic standards that we have to today, so we often find 
Ficino using second-hand citations and rarely acknowledging his sources.  Those who have translated 
works by Ficino have tried to supply some sources were possible, but much work remains to be done 
in this regard. 
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The second chapter covers Ficino‘s arguments about why he believes philosophy and religion can and 
should be reunited.  Florence in the 1400‘s had more than 15 different religious orders; however 
Ficino was not a member of any of them.  Cosimo de‘Medici‘s manuscript-hunters acquired a copy of 
the Corpus Hermeticum and Cosimo had Ficino stop translating Plato from Greek to Latin and 
instead work on the newly recovered Hermetica. In these works, Hermes Trismegistus is portrayed as 
the founder of theology so both men felt this manuscript contained conclusive evidence that ancient 
Greek philosophy and Christianity were strongly related.  The ideas contained in the Hermetica 
strongly influenced Ficino‘s theory of how and why ancient philosophy and the Christian religion 
were mutually supportive and should be reunited.  A number of quotes from De Christiana religione 
and his letters provide his rationale for the reunification.  To help focus this thesis, Ficino‘s writings 
pertaining to the image of God, the Godly attributes and the human/divine relation will be examined. 
The third chapter is an examination of his philosophical arguments about God‘s five main attributes: 
existence, simplicity, goodness, omniscience, and omnipotence.  Section 3.1 examines Ficino‘s belief 
that God‘s existence is necessary, however we find that his arguments for God‘s existence are more 
claims for the sense in which God exists rather than novel proofs for God‘s existence.  In Section 3.2 
Ficino‘s ideas about God‘s simplicity or unity are investigated. The medieval theology of Ficino‘s 
time followed the concept that God is simplicity and Ficino‘s theology was no different.  In the 
Renaissance period there was an ongoing debate pertaining to Averroes‘ theory of one material 
intellect and Ficino argued against Averroes.  Ficino‘s discussions about one God and the Trinity are 
also covered.  Ficino‘s arguments about the goodness of God are explored in section 3.3.  Ficino 
found that God‘s goodness resulted from God‘s simplicity.  He takes great pains to emphasize that 
God and the highest good (in the Platonic sense of good) are different.  One of his rare discussions 
about evil is also examined as he argues that there is no model for evil in God‘s presence, due to 
God‘s supreme goodness.  Section 3.4 presents Ficino‘s arguments about God‘s omniscience, and 
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again we find that one attribute is derived from another.  In this case omniscience comes about due to 
goodness.  Ficino‘s arguments about God knowing all true things and truth being timeless are 
examined along with the medieval notion of man as a microcosm (God is with you and within you).  
The final section of this chapter, 3.5, examines God‘s omnipotence in Ficino‘s works.  Like 
omniscience, omnipotence arises from God‘s goodness.  Ficino believes that God does everything 
through his own being (relying on nothing else), God‘s power is innate and that he is the prime 
mover.  Following the Peripatetic tradition, Ficino argues that God has the power to create anything 
as long as there is no contradiction and that his creations must be properly ordered. 
 In the fourth chapter the arguments used to rationalize the divine/human relationship are examined. 
In section 4.1, Ficino‘s arguments about the relationship between God and humans are highlighted 
and the relationship is found to be unique among the earthly creatures.  This cyclical relationship is 
started by God creating and loving humans, humans doing their part to venerate God and God 
granting the moral and pious humans a future life.  Ficino believes that humans have free will 
(although God is omniscient and knows what the individual humans will choose to do) and must 
choose to be active participants in the human/divine relationship.  In section 4.2 we find that people 
require guidance from God (if they are open to it) and it arrives in the form of divine illumination.  
Ficino uses both Platonic and Plotinian arguments to explain how God shares his wisdom with 
humans. Augustine also relied on divine illumination to guide humans but his theory was more 
epistemological while Ficino‘s is more ontological in nature.  In Ficino‘s time, the medieval celestial 
hierarchy of pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite was the predominant explanation of how the cosmos, 
with God at the highest level, was organized and Ficino fully accepted this arrangement.  Divine 
illumination provided a methodology for God‘s love and knowledge to travel down the hierarchy to 
individual humans.  For Ficino, the ontological hierarchy had five levels, with soul as the middle 
level. It was like the hierarchy in Plato‘s divided line scenario, but the soul sits on the divided line and 
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sometimes moves up the hierarchy and sometimes travels down the hierarchy. Given the differences 
in the composition and behaviour of the soul, Ficino has confused a member (mobile soul) of the 
hierarchy with an immobile level of the hierarchy.  The final section 4.4 examines some of Ficino‘s 
ideas about love because love is what motivates the human soul to try to move up the hierarchy to 
rejoin God; the wrong kind of love causes the soul to move down the hierarchy. Love is also what 
enables divine illumination to function.  Interestingly, Ficino argues that human will enjoys God more 
than our intellect. 
The fifth and final chapter summarizes the finds of the preceding chapters.  Ficino‘s arguments and 
ideas were part of the gradual shift from medieval traditions to the Renaissance notion of ‗the dignity 
of man‘ as he argued that humans are in God‘s image in a positive way, and that humans can be part 
of a positive, loving relationship with God.  Ficino had hoped to bring the Florentine intelligensi back 
to the church through the use of philosophy.  The examination of his philosophical arguments 
pertaining to religious topics finds many arguments by analogy and from authority, but no significant 
new arguments.  He did successfully employ many new Platonic and Plotinian ideas (he avoided 
censure by the authorities), but they were not enough for him to achieve his desire to reunite 
philosophy and religion. 
The original text is often presented, rather than summarized so that the reader may compare Ficino‘s 
own words and arguments with my interpretation.  To properly address the topic at hand, this thesis 
also includes the translation and exposition of portions of some Ficinian works not currently available 
in English, particularly his De Christiana religione and De raptu Pauli.  My transcription of the 1495 
Latin edition of De raptu Pauli is included in the Appendix.  
 1 
Chapter 1 
Ficino in Context 
1.1 Historical Context 
By the end of the middle ages, the power of the Holy Roman Emperors had begun to decline in 
northern Italy.  Local nobility had a monopoly on the politics of most city states, and the Pope also 
wielded considerable influence politically.  Florence survived the battles between the Ghibellines 
(those aligned with the Emperor) and the Guelphs (those aligned with the Pope), and by the mid-14
th
 
century, the Italian city states (as a mode of civic governance) were well established, with the Guilds 
growing in economic and political power.  Over time, Florence developed (although not without 
struggle, e.g., the Revolt of the Ciompi) a complex system of government, with its ranks drawn from 
the middle class.  It is noteworthy that the complexity of the social and political systems helped to 
prevent a tyranny from developing.  Even though the Medici were the most powerful family in 
Florence for several generations, they never held an official government office. 
The Medici family had moved from rural Mugello to Florence late in the 13
th
 century when they 
abandoned agriculture and began to pursue commercial ventures.  By the late 14
th
 century, Giovanni 
de‘Medici (1360-1428) was a leading banker, who had branches in Italy, France, England, Germany, 
and the Netherlands.
1
  In the early 1400s, he began to involve himself in city politics and made large 
contributions for the betterment of Florence (e.g., providing financial aid during an outbreak of 
plague and for renovations to San Lorenzo).  Despite the malicious gossip of rivals in commerce and 
                                                     
1
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banking, by the time Giovanni de‘Medici died in 1428, he was seen as a business visionary and a 
generous man.  This image provided a basis from which the Medici family fortunes would grow. 
Their influence on the people and fortunes of Florence would be immeasurable. 
Giovanni's son, Cosimo the Elder (1389-1464), took over the direction of the family fortunes.  
Political maneuvering had the Medici exiled from Florence for a time; however, with the demise of 
the short-lived Albizzi dictatorship, Cosimo and his family returned to Florence.  Cosimo was active 
in the culture and arts of the city.  Over the years, artists such as Brunelleschi, Luca della Robbia, Fra 
Angelico, Andrea del Castagno, Donatello, and Paolo Uccello executed works for him.  In 1444, 
Cosimo founded the Medici library at San Marco, the first public library in Europe.
2
  Fired by his 
thirst for ancient works, he sent collectors out to acquire manuscripts.  The collection of ancient 
manuscripts grew rapidly and included works by Cicero, Tacitus, Virgil, and Pliny the Elder.  Cosimo 
also added several works by Florentine writers, including Dante and Petrarch.
3
  Ficino claims his 
father was Cosimo‘s favourite doctor and that the elder Ficino planned for his son to also become a 
doctor.  Hence the younger Ficino accompanied his father, Dietifeci (the doctor) to see Cosimo 
de‘Medici and according to the stories, Cosimo saw different talents in the younger Ficino and 
supported his education.  For the remainder of his life, Cosimo continued to build the Medici empire, 
foster the intellectual life of Florence, and encourage artists.  When Cosimo died in 1464 at Careggi, 
his son Piero, the Gouty (1416-1469), took over the Medici holdings and challenging political legacy. 
Piero continued to support the arts, most notably Botticelli, and continued some patronage for Ficino, 
including having him tutor his son Lorenzo. During his five years as head of the Medici family, Piero 
                                                     
2
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survived many challenges, including an assassination attempt by the Pazzi family
4
 and a war with 
Vienna.  The stress of leading took its toll, however, and Piero died in December 1469. 
Piero's son Lorenzo, the Magnificent (1449-1492), now came to the fore.  He had his grandfather's 
political astuteness as well as a love of the arts and literature.  Under his leadership, Florence became 
the universal capital of culture and the arts.  Thanks to the circle of intellectuals and artists living at 
the Magnificent's court, Humanism and the Renaissance continued to spread from Florence 
throughout Europe, giving impetus to a movement of ideas destined to influence history profoundly 
for two centuries to come.‖
5
  Lorenzo helped revive the University of Pisa in 1472.  At his urging, the 
University of Florence (also known as Studio Florentine or Studium Generale) took in several Greek 
scholars who had fled Constantinople when it fell in 1453, and by 1488, they had published the first 
printed collection of Homeric poems.
6
  Lorenzo also continued the family tradition of procuring 
ancient manuscripts, and the copies made by his scribes and miniaturists made these works more 
widely available than ever before.  These manuscripts became the first holdings of the Biblioteca 
Laurenziana.  He also became an art connoisseur and collector.  He founded a sculpture school in his 
courtyard, and it was there that he discovered the young Michelangelo.
7
 
Lorenzo lacked a strong business sense, yet he could be cunning and cold in his political dealings.  
Pope Sixtus IV wanted to expand his power by controlling Florence, and he enlisted the Pazzi family, 
bitter Medici rivals in commerce, to assist with his plans.  The Pazzi conspiracy, as it came to be 
known, failed however; while the attackers murdered his brother Giuliano, Lorenzo escaped and 
survived.  The backlash was swift and violent; over eighty people died, including the Archbishop, and 
                                                     
4
 Ficino, 1988 ―The Pazzi Conspiracy and Ficino,‖ provides a detailed account of Ficino's involvement with 
both sides of the dispute. 
5
 Cesati, p. 33 
6
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 4 
the Pazzi family was ruined.  Nevertheless, Lorenzo's troubles with the Pope continued and, finally, 
in 1480, Lorenzo secured the support of Ferdinand, King of Naples, and brought the conflict to a 
peaceful end.
8
  The Medici family suffered losses over the next few years, but politically, life was 
relatively stable except for Savonarola who declared Florence to be morally corrupt, and held the 
Medici responsible for the de-christianization of the Republic.  By this time, Lorenzo was in poor 
health and did not engage Savonarola. 
When Lorenzo died in April 1492, the leadership the Medici family passed to his son, Piero (the 
Unfortunate).  Less than successful war negotiations with Charles VIII of France made Piero a traitor 
in the eyes of the Florentines.  In 1494, the remaining Medici fled Florence under the cover of 
darkness.  Savonarola emerged as a leader in the new republic and sought to make Florence a living 
model of the Christian religion.  Savonarola continued his quest for religious and political power, and 
in 1496, the infamous ―Bonfire of the Vanities‖ was held.  A republic which had lived life to the 
fullest now lived in fear of the Dominican friar‘s growing political influence.  In response, an anti-
Savonarola party formed and grew, eventually seeking support from the Pope.  In 1497, the Pope 
intervened, and Savonarola was tried and condemned to death.  Ironically, he was burned at the stake 
in 1498 at the same place where the 1496 Bonfire had burned.  The new Florentine government 
formed in 1498, and one of its lesser officials was Niccolò Machiavelli.  Florence, in a weakened 
political and military state, moved into the 16
th
 century. 
1.2 Brief Ficinian Biography 
Marsilio Ficino was born October 19, 1433, near Florence.  His father was an eminent doctor who 
tended the important families of Florence, including the Medici.  Ficino often went with his father on 
medical rounds, presumably to learn the trade.  Later in life, when called upon as a doctor he provided 
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the appropriate service (medicines, advice, or music) and never accepted payment (in the Hippocratic 
tradition).  During such visits to the Medici household, the young Ficino's extraordinary desire to 
learn and intellectual prowess impressed Cosimo the Elder.  It is reported that Cosimo said ―You, 
Ficino … have been sent to us to heal bodies, but your Marsilio here has been sent down from heaven 
to heal souls.‖
9
  Cosimo ensured that the young Marsilio receive a good education (which included 
learning the Greek language)
10
 and likely financed his studies at the University of Florence, where he 





, The Life of Marsilio Ficino, extols Ficino's accomplishments in bringing Plato 
back to prominence and claims that ―This was made possible by the astonishing fecundity of his 
mind, his burning zeal, and his extraordinary indifference to all pleasure and, above all, to material 
wealth.‖
13
  Corsi goes on to describe Ficino as a man who struggled to maintain his health, and who, 
―By nature ... was mild, refined and gentle; … He easily forgot injury, but was never forgetful of 
obligations.‖
14
  Corsi notes that although Ficino ate sparingly, ―he did select the most excellent wines.  
For he was rather disposed towards wine, yet he never went away from parties drunk or fuddled, 
though often more cheerful.‖
15
  He also claimed that Ficino was a model son and always helped his 
friends, using his influence with the Medici if necessary: ―He was swift to comfort those afflicted by 
misfortune; indeed, he exercised more gentleness in comforting those in distress than severity in 
reproving wrongdoers.  In short, he showed humanity, gentleness, and love to all alike.‖
16
  By all 
accounts, Corsi‘s in particular, Ficino was respected and loved by the people of Florence.  Kristeller 
notes that Ficino‘s writings were of interest to the middle class of Florence and that it was for some 
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important people (e.g. Clarice Orsini, Giovanni Rucellai, Jacopo Guicciardini, and Bernardo del 
Nero) in this economic class that he wrote some of his treatises.
17
 
Cosimo de‘Medici helped to lure the Council for Reconciliation between the Roman Catholic and 
Greek Orthodox churches from Ferrara to Florence.  The Council worked from 1439-1443, and it was 
during this time that Cosimo was first introduced to Plato‘s philosophy.  The Greek scholar 
Gemisthos Plethon gave talks on Platonic ideas, about which Cosimo had a burning desire to know 
more.
18
  He set about procuring a comprehensive copy of Plato's works (in Greek), and in 1452, years 
after the Council, set Marsilio Ficino to the task of mastering the Greek language and then translating 
the collected Platonic works into Latin.  Cosimo gave Ficino access to the Medici family estate at 
Careggi (outside of Florence) in 1462, so that Ficino could be in an atmosphere conducive to 
translation and philosophical work.  The Careggi estate was a favorite haunt of the Medici and those 
artists and intellectuals the family supported (Brunelleschi, della Robbia, della Mirandola, Donatello, 
and Botticelli, among others) as well as important government and religious officials who often 
stayed at Careggi and made Ficino's acquaintance.  Ficino corresponded with many of these 
influential people and late in life (1495) published these letters as a twelve-volume set.  When 
Cosimo acquired a newly discovered manuscript of the Corpus Hermeticum, he ordered Ficino to stop 
translating Plato's works and instead work on the Corpus Hermeticum.  Both men felt it contained 
conclusive evidence that Christianity and Greek philosophy were linked because Hermes 
Trismegistus was identified as the ―founder of theology.‖
19
  This finding formed the basis for Ficino's 
claim that the two ideological systems, Greek philosophy and the Judeo-Christian religion, were 
compatible and hence informed his ideas about the image of man, and God‘s image which are 
reflected in his many writings.  Initially, Cosimo provided for Ficino‘s basic needs, but he did not 
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financially support Ficino in all his endeavours.  Ficino worked as a part-time tutor to Cosimo's 
grandson Lorenzo de‘Medici.  A friendship (and patronage) between Ficino and Lorenzo then 
endured and the strength of the relationship varied over the years as evidenced by the many letters 
they exchanged.  After Cosimo‘s death in 1464, support from Piero de‘Medici was inconsistent so 
Ficino turned to other patrons, such as Filippo Valori and Francesco Berlinghieri, who paid for the 
printing of some of Ficino‘s books.  Ficino was lecturing at the Studio Florentine beginning in 1466,
20
 
but his main income (albeit meager) came from his religious appointments.  In 1470, Ficino was 
given the benefice of Santa Maria a Monte Vargi, three years before his ordination (it is likely he had 
taken minor orders).  He became an ordained deacon in September 1473, and in December of the 
same year was ordained as a priest by Mgr. Giuliano de Antonio.
21
  In 1473 Lorenzo de‘Medici then 
arranged two church benefices for Ficino: as pievano of St. Bartholomew in Pomino, and in Novoli, 
he was the parish priest for St. Christopher. Later, in 1488, Lorenzo successfully petitioned the Pope 
to procure Ficino a third benefice as Canon at Santa Maria del Fiore, the Florentine cathedral.  This 




Ficino did not live exclusively at Careggi, nor in a monastery, as his church responsibilities meant 
some travel (e.g., to St. Christopher in Novoli and the Cathedral in Florence), although the majority of 
his public activities appear to have taken place in Florence (e.g., his lectures at S. Maria degli 
Angeli
23
), and later in life he had a house in Florence, where he took care of his mother, niece, and 
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22
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23





  While Ficino focused on religion and philosophy, everyday life in Renaissance Florence 
went on. 
In a religious context, Concilliarism and the Western Schism both influenced the time in which Ficino 
lived.  The question of whether the Pope or a king had ultimate authority led to conflicts and 
eventually resulted in the Avignon Papacy (1305-1377).  In response to the Pope moving from Rome 
to Avignon, many believed that the Pope was no longer the best choice to decide on spiritual issues. 
The theologians advocated that a council of Christians should be the final authority on spiritual 
matters, not the Pope.  Pope Gregory XI returned the Papal court to Rome in 1378, however after his 
death the College of Cardinals elected two popes and the church‘s Western Schism began (one Pope 
in Rome, one Pope in Avignon).  The Council of Constance (1414-18) ended the schism with the 
election of Martin V; however the Papacy essentially became a monarchy.
25
 
Politically, times were turbulent.  Buonaccorso Pitti‘s
26
 diary outlines his personal role in numerous 
political situations and negotiations in the late 1390s and early 1400s, some of which would impact 
events in Ficino‘s lifetime.  There was the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and an increasing threat 
from the Turks.  The Peace of Lodi (Venice, Milan, Florence and Naples) provided a temporary calm 
between some of the Italian city states.  It worked for a few years, but was then shattered by Lorenzo 
de‘Medici‘s actions.  The expulsions of the Medici, the Pazzi conspiracy in 1478 (Ficino had 
corresponded with some of the plotters), Florentine political jockeying between different branches of 
the government, the influence of the guilds, various papal alliances, the fundamentalism of 
Savonarola, and political tensions with France and Spain were among the intrigues of the times. 
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In spite of the political goings-on, there was an active intellectual community in Florence.  Where and 
when various groups met has been the subject of vigorous debate and part of that debate has been 
about the ―Platonic Academy‖ that may have existed in Florence during the latter half of the 1400s.
27
  
It appears that there were gatherings to discuss the new translations of Plato and Ficino's 
commentaries on them; however, these gatherings cannot really be called an ―Academy‖ if one uses 
―academy‖ in the same sense as Plato's Academy.  Perhaps it was a self-styled ―academy.‖  Ficino 
claims that his commentary on Plato's Symposium is based on a dinner party held in honour of Plato's 
birthday.
28
  Were the dinner guests members of the so-called Academy?  Possibly, but not likely.  In a 
letter to Francesco Musano, Ficino writes, ―You asked me yesterday to transcribe for you that maxim 
of mine that is inscribed around the walls of the Academy.  Receive it: ‗All things are directed from 
goodness to goodness.  Rejoice in the present; set no value on property, seek no honors.  Avoid 
excess; avoid activity.  Rejoice in the present.‘ ‖
29
  It is uncertain whether this reference to walls 
indicates that the Academy had a meeting place or whether the words were inscribed in one of 
Ficino's rooms at Careggi (or elsewhere).  Weissman proposes that Ficino may have been involved in 
a confraternity,
30
 and perhaps some of Ficino‘s talks and discussions at the confraternity gatherings 
have been misconstrued as an academy. 
While there are questions about the academy, there is no question that Ficino was an active translator 
and prolific writer.  Cosimo the Elder died before Ficino had completed translating all the available 
works by Plato.  Cosimo's son Piero encouraged Ficino to continue the translations and 
commentaries.  He also encouraged Ficino to make the translations and commentaries publically 
available and thereby share these ―new‖ ideas with the public.  After Piero's death in 1469, Lorenzo 
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29
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maintained the Medici's patronage of Ficino. As Bullard notes, it is rare for someone to maintain the 
patronage of a family for three generations.
31
  The Dominican friar, Girolamo Savonarola was elected 
prior of San Marco and arrived in Florence in 1490 to fulfill this role.  Initially, Ficino engaged 
Savonarola in debating the role of religion in everyday life and praised him as a prophet in a 
December 1494 letter.
32
  Quickly Savonrola‘s sermons became more anti-humanistic, with frequent 
verbal attacks on the Medici, Plato (e.g., ―An old woman knows more about the Faith than Plato‖
33
), 
and anything else he felt was non-Christian.  Ficino disagreed with Savonarola‘s austere practices and 
vitriolic sermons and ceased all contact with him.  In 1498 (after Savonarola‘s death) Ficino wrote a 
piece condemning Savonarola‘s beliefs and practices.
34
 Marsilio Ficino died on October 1, 1499, and 
was entombed at Santa Maria del Fiore, the Cathedral of Florence. 
1.3 Intellectual Context 
Humanism, from studia humanitatis, is a term used to distinguish the seven Liberal Arts, the trivium 
(grammar, logic, and rhetoric) and quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy) from 
more vocationally-oriented studies such as engineering.  Humanistic studies  
were approached in a spirit of enquiry often entailing little respect 
for the intellectual authority traditionally exercised by the Catholic 
church.  Humanism also involved the culture and institutions of 
classical antiquity and a desire to restore them in the contemporary 
world: the wish to communicate new and revived knowledge by 
reformed educational practices, improved texts and learned discourse 
in academies, universities and informal gatherings.
35
 
The humanists focused on the centrality, dignity, freedom, and worth of man via the literature of the 
day.  It was not a philosophical movement, nor was it religious.  The humanists Petrarch and Salutati 
seem to have influenced a number of Ficino's ideas.  Like them, Ficino apparently hoped to elevate 
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the status of the church and the value of religion for the humanists by associating classical writings 
with elements of Christian scripture. 
Francesco Petrarca (1304-1374) was seen as ―the supreme example of a mind free of all 
scholasticism, which considered itself and man's destiny in the light of the eloquent philosophy of 
Cicero or Seneca and the intimate religious experience of St. Augustine.‖
36
  He ―dominated the 
spiritual horizon of Florence,‖
37
  inspired the humanists, and influenced a generation of thinkers with 




One of Petrarch's followers, Coluccio Salutati, was elected Chancellor of the Florentine Republic in 
1375.  Despite much political turmoil and the increased strength of the Guilds, Salutati continued to 
emphasize a republic ―where liberty still had meaning and value.‖
39
  Hard-working citizens mattered 
because virtue was obtained from honest work and achieved in daily struggles, which allowed the 
Florentine republic to set itself apart from the system of feudal aristocracy and privilege. 
The leading men (civic, religious and business) of the Republic often gathered to discuss ancient 
texts, the art of politics and rhetoric, education, the etymology of the Latin language, and lessons 
from history.  For this reason, ancient texts were often sought and brought back to Florence.  Salutati 
established a Studium and brought Greek studies and the Greek language to the West.  Many wealthy 
citizens established private libraries.  One of the Studium's best pupils, Leonardo Bruni (1374-1444), 
succeeded Salutati as Chancellor in 1410 and continued the established humanist tradition.  The 
leading philosophical trend, particularly in the universities, was Aristotelian-Christian.  As no 
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comprehensive set of Platonic works was available, Aristotle was the best available philosophy of the 
time. 
The increasingly ―human‖ focus in the cultural mindset permeated all levels of society.  The Italian 
Renaissance was underway, and it was into this atmosphere that the Medici family entered with 
enthusiasm.  By the time Marsilio Ficino was born in 1433, it was firmly entrenched in Florentine 
culture that everyday life had profound meaning and religious validity. 
1.4 Ficino’s Works 
Ficino‘s first philosophic undertaking, The Platonic Institutions, was written in 1456, but no copies 
are known to exist.
40
  Kristeller published the Latin text of some very early Ficino works (~1454-55), 
likely from his student days.
41
  Ficino began his translations of Platonic works, but this was 
interrupted by the discovery of the Corpus Hermeticum and Cosimo‘s desire to have the latter 
translated immediately.  Ficino‘s translations and works were put into wider circulation than those of 
many of his predecessors due to the arrival of the printing press in Florence.  This dramatic shift from 
scribes copying manuscripts to book production by a printing press occurred in the very early 1470s. 
In 1469, Ficino completed and circulated the Platonic translations and went on to translate many other 
―ancient‖ works by authors such as Plotinus (The Enneads), Iamblichus (On the Pythagorean School), 
Porphyry (Means for Reaching the Divine), Proclus (On Priesthood), and Psellus (On Daemons).  He 
also provided commentaries and chapter summaries for many of his translations.  Ficino did for Plato, 
Plotinus, and other ancient philosophers what the literary humanists did for the ancient orators, poets, 
and historians, that is, he saved them from obscurity and brought them to prominence where they 
contributed to the religious, philosophical and intellectual discussions of the time.  In addition, Ficino 
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wrote several of his own works, including De Christiana religione (1474), De raptu Pauli (1474-5), 
Platonic Theology (1479), Advice against the Plague (1479), and Three Books on Life (1489). 
Ficino's works were not meant solely for scholars or theologians; his target audience was the 
Florentine intelligensi.  Ficino's aim was to keep the intellectuals and politically powerful faithful to 
Christianity by using well reasoned arguments and intellectual conviction.
42
  In early 1490, the 
Roman Curia accused him of at least one unknown offence against religion based on his writing in 
Book III of Three Books on Life.  Ficino enlisted the help and support of his colleagues and a lawyer, 
such that nothing became of the charge.
43
  During Savonarola‘s time in Florence, Ficino kept a low 
profile, finishing the twelve books of Epistolae for publication in 1495 and working on 
commentaries.  His last work was a commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul, which he left unfinished.  
The table below provides a listing of when Ficino‘s works were written and published.
44
 
Table 1 Works by Ficino 
Written Printed Title 
1454-1455  Manuscripts: Summa philosophie ad Michaelem 
Miniatensem; Tractatus physicus; Tractatus de Deo natura 
et arte; Tractatus de anima; Tractatus physicus; Questiones 
de luce et alie multe; De sono; Divisio philosophie. 
1456  The Platonic Institutions (lost) 
1457  On the Moral Virtues; On the Four Schools of 
Philosophers; On God and the Soul (all three were not 
published) 
1457 1497 De divino furore 
1457-8 1497 De voluptate 
1458  Translations of Hymns of Orpheus and Hymns of Proclus 
(not published); Sayings of Zoroaster 
1463 1471; several reprints Translation: Corpus Hermeticum 
1464-69 1496 10 Platonic translations: Hipparchus, On Philosophy, 
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Written Printed Title 
Theages, Meno, Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Minos, 
Euthyphro, Parmenides, Philebus 
1469 1484 Commentary on Plato’s Symposium on Love 
1474 1474, and 1484 (with 
revisions by Ficino) – 
Tuscan 
1476 - Latin 
De Christiana religione 
1474-75  Epistolae, I 
1476  Epistolae, II (including De raptu Pauli) 
1476 1476 – Latin 
1477 - Tuscan 
De raptu Pauli 
1479 1479 – Tuscan 
1518 - Latin 
Consiglio contro la pestilenza – Translated into Latin by 
Augusta Vindelicorum 
1470‘s 1482, 1491 Platonic Theology 
 1484; several reprints Complete Works of Plato (includes Commentaries on 
Symposium and Timaeus) 
1485-90? 1492 Translation of Enneads by Plotinus (includes 
Commentaries) 
1488 1497 Translations of works by Porphyry, Priscian, Proclus, 
Psellus, Synesius and Iamblichus‘ De mysteris Aegyptiorum, 
Chaldaeorum, atque Asyriorum,  
  Translations of Aurea verba and Symbola by Pythagoras 
 1489 De vita libri tres 
1490  Commentary on Lucretius (The Nature of Things) 
lost/destroyed? 
 1491; several reprints Opera Omnia 
 1493 Apologia in lib. suum de sole & lumine 
 1495, several reprints Epistolae (Books 1-12) 
1492? 1496 Mystic Theology and Divine Names, by pseudo-Dionysius 
(translations) 
1498?  Apologia contra Savonarolam 
1497-99  Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul (unfinished) 
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1.5 Ficino's Writing Style 
As Ficino‘s personality is complex, his works are very syncretic in nature; for example, he connects 
the Christian trinity and Platonic triads,
45
 numbers and cosmology,
46
 and human health with planetary 
influences.
47
  Ficino's writing style differs markedly from that of the majority of today‘s philosophical 
writers.  He wrote in a very metaphorical and allegorical style and clearly took his cue from the 
ancients: ―It was the custom of Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato alike to hide divine mysteries 
everywhere behind the mask of figurative language, to conceal their wisdom discreetly in contrast to 
the Sophists' boasting, to jest in seriousness and play in earnest.‖
48
  At times, Ficino was very direct 
about this, as, for example, in his letter, The Allegory of Mercury where he illustrates why God 
wished to signify wisdom, the greatest of the virtues, through Mercury, the smallest of the heavenly 
bodies.
49
  However, most of the time, readers must invoke their imagination, knowledge of 
mythology, ancient medicine, history, Christian religion, Platonic and neoplatonic philosophy, 
Florentine personages, astronomy and ancient cosmology if they hope to understand what Ficino was 
saying.  Standards of scholarship that are generally adopted today were not part of Ficino's awareness.  
He is known to have used direct quotation and mildly altered portions of the works of others.
50
  Ficino 
also reused small sections of his own material in various works.  For example, he uses the story – 
found in Plato‘s Statesman [269C-274D] – about the east to west rotation of the earth someday 
reversing itself, in both the Platonic Theology
51
 and his commentary on the Statesman.
52
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In Ficino's syncretic style, it can be hard to tell if one idea directly influenced another, or if the idea 
was just a good example to illustrate the point being made.  It has taken this author a great deal of 
time and reading to begin to understand the rich implications of Ficino‘s many puns (e.g., Cosimo 
and Cosmos), his reuse and reformulation of the theses of other writers (both philosophic and 
religious), his late medieval Catholicism, planetary attributes and the medieval cosmology, 
renaissance medicine – particularly the concepts involving humours – and the many metaphorical 
references to planetary gods and their perceived attributes. 
Many Renaissance writers saw literature, science, medicine, art, philosophy, and religion as 
components of a unity and, hence, to be studied and contemplated in a holistic manner.  Ficino was no 
different.  He writes metaphorically and allegorically, with a heavy reliance on imagination, so his 
ideas and arguments are often expressed as poetic images, not logical, linear statements.  However, 
the scholasticism of medieval philosophy did influence Ficino and is evident in his terminology, 
method of argumentation, many of his ontological principles, and the respect he gives to Aristotle and 
some of his commentators.
53
 
Comprehending the true meaning of something required people to earn their understanding through 
faith, study, and deep thought.  Metaphorical images succeed when what is written (painted, mimed, 
etc.) resonates with the same core meaning in different people, but the edges of understanding are 
slightly different for each member of the audience.  If a person could be at the core of the sun, the 
super bright light would be seen, while the further away a person moves from the center, the light 
becomes more diffused.  The beauty of metaphors is that people do not always consciously recognize 
why something resonates with them, just that it does.  For Ficino, metaphors were where his esoteric 
notions gained value when set in a Christian context.  He could safely bring in non-Christian elements 
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and let individuals find their own meaning within their own comfort level.  Ficino himself recognized 
what he was doing with his creative imagery and states in De sole that the only way to speak of God 
is metaphorically: ―Words to the reader: this book is allegorical and anagogic, rather than 
dogmatic.‖
54
  He seemed to believe that his interpretations could provide lay readers with a deeper 
understanding and appreciation for the topic at hand.  In addition, Ficino strived to make his works 
available to a wider audience by providing some of them in the vernacular (e.g., Della religione 
cristiana and Consiglio contro la pestilenza]. 
It can be useful to try to understand and interpret Ficino‘s works as one would the images in art or 
poetry.  For instance, in Three Books on Life, Ficino uses the planets as a way of imagining our inner 
world as a reflection of the outer world, not as astrology in the sense of birth charts, zodiacal signs, or 
horoscopes.  Some of the commonly-found planetary attributes and associations he uses are as 
follows: 
 Sun: active, male 
 Moon: passive, female, moist, reflexive, continuous motion 
 Jupiter: nourishing, moderation, tolerance, god of common life 
 Mars: anger, violence, hot, dry, iron (metal) 
 Mercury: bright, quick, light, moist, messenger of the Greek gods 
 Saturn: aloof, cold, heavy dark, lead (metal), dry, depression, fall season 
 Venus: spirituality, sensuality, love, moist, spring season 
Kaske and Clark, translators of Ficino‘s Three Books on Life, suggest that Ficino's citations are often 
second-hand and note that he only occasionally acknowledged his sources.  Editors and translators 
including Kaske and Clark, Kristeller, and Allen, have supplied some notes about possible sources; 
however, much work remains to be done in this area.  Many editors have chosen not to worry 
excessively about the citations, and Kaske and Clark warn the reader that ―to second-guess him in 
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every case would be an endless task; hence we usually take him at his word and hereby warn the 
reader of his oversimplification and our own.  Nor have we felt obligated always to note all of 
Ficino's distortions of the sources.‖
55
  Farndell took the same approach in his collection of Ficino's 
Platonic commentaries.  Although not all of Ficino‘s sources have been identified, three main themes 
in his writing are clear: promoting the Christian traditions (e.g., pushing away the physical world, and 
Christ imparting God‘s sacred knowledge) especially as they relate to ancient-inspired philosophic 
knowledge; revealing and saving the old wisdom; and protecting the ancient (Plato, Plotinus, etc.) 
philosophic truths from erroneous and improper interpretation.  Ficino claims that the two ideological 
systems, Greek philosophy and the Judeo-Christian religion are compatible.  There are several articles 
and books about Ficino‘s formulation of Platonic love, immortality of the soul, the dignity of 
humankind and the philosophical arguments he makes to support those ideas.  Trinkaus has provided 
a look at Ficino‘s man in God‘s image
56
, with his main focus on Ficino‘s philosophy as it pertained to 
the human soul‘s immortality.  Kristeller focused on Ficino‘s humanism and philosophy
57
. 
Currently, few of Ficino‘s religious works are available in the English language.  While all eighteen 
books of the Platonic Theology can be found in translation, works such as De Christiana religione, 
Praedictiones, Epistolas D. Pauli, and Ficino‘s second book of letters, including De raptu Pauli are 
not.  The London School of Economics has produced translations Ficino‘s letters from books 1 and 3-
9, but passed over the second volume as it ―is a work of rather a different kind, and the translators 
therefore felt it would be desirable to continue to translate Ficino‘s correspondence in sequence and 
defer work on Book II until a later date.‖
58
  The translators felt that the letters of Book II were more 
like essays laden with philosophical and theological themes.  The letter from Book II, known as ‗The 
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 have focused their Ficino research on spiritus and magic as presented in Three Books 
on Life, and his translation and interpretation of the Hermetica.  Kristeller‘s extensive work on Ficino 
focuses on the humanist and philosophical works, but very little on the faith-related treatises, 
although he did examine some of Ficino‘s ideas about the nature of God as presented in Platonic 
Theology (but the examination did not include Ficino‘s more religious works).
62
  Collins has 
examined Ficino‘s reliance on Aquinas in the Platonic Theology.
63
  Edelheit has looked at most of the 
theological works, but in the context of a religious crisis in Renaissance Florence.
64
  ‗Ficino the 
Priest‘ by Serracino-Inglott examines Ficino‘s conception of a priest as a healer.
65
  Allen‘s scholarly 
output tends towards Ficino‘s Platonic and neo-platonic translations and accompanying 
commentaries, although he has addressed some of Ficino‘s theological issues such as angelic 
hierarchies and the prisca theologia.  Allen comments that Ficino may have been driven by ―the 
conviction that he was discovering something that had been lost and would be lost again if it were not 
caught in his exegetical net.‖
66
  He notes that Ficino wrote in the ―time –honoured erotic imagery of 
unveiling the nakedness of truth or of penetration to the core, to the fruit of a mystery; at other times 
he thought of it as establishing contact with a forgotten philosophical or – since he thought 
ecumenically – a theological past.‖
67
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There has been very little analysis of Ficino‘s belief in the compatibility of philosophy and religion, 
and his notions about God.  This thesis examines whether or not Ficino was successful in arguing for 





Ficino’s Reasons for Reuniting Religion and Philosophy 
By 1454 or 1455, Ficino was already producing religious writing.  The Tractatus de Deo
68
 examines 
act, form and potency in the nature and craft of God.  It is interesting to note that at this early stage of 
his career he states ―it [the mind] is as a blank slate on the entry to the body‖.
69
  Perhaps this 
conviction is why he never subscribed to Plato‘s theory of learning by recollection.  His description of 
the mind as a tabula rasa also predates John Locke‘s famous theory of education by over two 
hundred years.  Ficino‘s Tractatus de Deo was written almost twenty years before he became a priest 
and before he knew Greek or Plato‘s works. 
Florence in the 1400‘s was home to many types of religious houses: Benedictine, S. Salvatore, 
Augustinian, S. Basil, Franciscan, Camaldolese, Sylvestrine, Carmelite, Cistercian, Dominican, 
Observant Dominican, Gesuati, Oliventan, Servite, Humiliati, Vallombrosan, Celestine and 
Augustinian Hermits.
70
  Ficino, however, was not a monk or friar, nor was he a member of a religious 
order as he had patrons and did not live in a monastery.  Given that he was not a member of a 
monastic order, Ficino therefore had more intellectual freedom in his religious interpretations and 
presentations.  Ficino did associate with members of other religious orders such as Antonio Serafico 
Morali (San Miniato, Oliventan), Lonardo Perugino and Girolamo Rossi (Dominicans), and one of his 
own benefices, Saint Bartholomew‘s, was part of the Benedictine order.  Ficino‘s initial contact with 
the Camaldolese order is likely a result of his father, Dietifeci (the doctor) serving as a witness for 
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various legal dealings of the Camaldolese church.
 71
  During his adult life, Ficino had numerous 
Camaldosian friends.  Ambrogio Travasari of the Florence Camaldelesians translated many works 
such as those by Aeneas of Gaza, pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Diogenes Laertius, and a number 
of the Greek Fathers.  These Greek to Latin translations later became valuable resources for Ficino.
72
  
Santa Maria degli Angeli belonged to the Camaldolese brethren, and it was a place that Ficino gave 
talks on Plato and Plotinus.
73
  According to Lackner, Ficino also ―preached sermons, celebrated the 
monastic offices and developed a circle of initiates among the white-robed [Camaldolese] brethren.‖
74
 
Several Camaldolese tenets meshed well with Ficino‘s ideas.  Saint Romuald, founder of the order, 
espoused a theology of mystical ascent in which there were ―[a]scending hierarchies of being ... [and 
a] vision of cosmic harmony illumined by heavenly love.‖
75
  The Camaldolese idea of ‗climbing a 
ladder to heaven‘ was a way to express the belief that natural desires could be transformed into a 
desire for God.  We find these Camaldolesian ideas expressed often in Ficino‘s writings.  For 
example the first sermon in Opera Omnia contains this notion: 
I pray my brothers ... see the ladder, with God leading, we succeed.  
Certainly on this [ladder] the heavenly angels ascend and descend 
equally.  Indeed they ascend contemplating the God of Gods in Zion.  
Meanwhile they descend soon looking after the men.  They descend, 
I say, seizing the hands of men.  They [the angels] ascend again, 
soon leading [us], seized to the heights.  O the valuable ladder! O the 
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This passage is reminiscent of two biblical verses: ―Very truly, I tell you, you will see heaven opened 
and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man,"
77
 and ―he dreamed that there 
was a ladder set up on the earth, the top of it reaching to heaven; and the angels of God were 
ascending and descending on it.‖
78
  One also finds the image of a ladder in Platonic Theology 
§XII.3.3, and Ficino likens the ladder imagery to Homer's golden chain in Platonic Theology, 
§XIII.4.15.  It appears that he also adapted the idea of the great shining chain of pseudo-Dionysius the 
Areopagite.
79 
Ficino was not a humanist in the same sense as Salutati or Bruni, but more of a religious humanist.  
As Kristeller says, 
Renaissance humanism as such was not Christian or pagan, Catholic 
or Protestant, scientific or antiscientific, civic or despotic, Platonist 
or Aristotelian, Stoic or Epicurean, optimistic or pessimistic, active 
or contemplative, although it is easy to find for any of these attitudes, 
and for many others, a certain number of humanists who favored 
them. What they all have in common, is something else: a scholarly, 




Renaissance humanism was a diverse synthesis of theological, ideological, and religious ideas, not a 
single overriding orientation.  If one considers Ficino a religious humanist, it is possible to argue that 
he went one step further than many of his literary contemporaries in his use of sources from classical 
antiquity by adding philosophy into the mix.  His theory of how the Christian religion and ancient 
philosophy ought to co-exist and be mutually reinforcing is one formulation of a prisca theologia. 
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Ficino uses the prisca theologia to confirm for believers and to convince non-believers of the validity 
of fundamental ideas such as the Trinity and Christ as the Son of God.  He believes that God inspired 
Orpheus, Plato, Trismegistus and Zoroaster to discover these mysterious religious truths. 
Orpheus called this Pallas, the [one] born from only the head of 
Jupiter {Zeus}.  Plato in the Letter to Hermias, named this the son of 
father God.  In Epinomis he [Plato] called [it] the Word, that is, the 
reasoning and the Word saying: The most divine Word of all has 
encouraged this visible world.  Mercury Trismegistus often mentions 
the Word and the Son of God and the Spirit also.  Zoroaster likewise 
attributes an intellectual offspring to God.  Indeed those men have 
said what they could and indeed [said] that with God‘s help.  But 
only God understands this and to the man whom God will have 
wished to reveal [it].
81
  
By joining these ancient writings with Christian truths, Ficino seems to be pointing out that 
Christianity has existed for all of eternity; the ancients just did not realize it, but they were able to 
identify some valuable religious truths. 
His formulation of the prisca theologia was not a rigid catholic dogma, but more of an inclusive 
synthesis (inevitable given that most of the prisci theologi were pagan).  In his view, philosophers and 
priests used to be one and the same.  He believed that religion and philosophy were once united in the 
ancient traditions.  Ficino pointed to the Persians, Indian Brahman, Egyptians and Ethiopians and 
their traditions where the same men were both wise men and priests (and in some cases healers too).  
He moved forward in time and pointed to the Druids in Gaul and several ancient Greeks as having the 
same combined skill set.  He ends the argument here with examples of more recent Romans, 
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―Likewise, who is unaware how great was the zeal for wisdom and the sacred among the Romans on 
the part of: Numa Pompilius, Soran Valerius, Marcus Varro, and many others?‖
82
 
In his day, Ficino was keenly aware of the rift between wisdom and religion, and his hope was to 
reunite the two in the minds of everyone by demonstrating that philosophy and Christianity had been 
united and should return to supporting each other.  In De Christiana religione, he bemoans the current 
state of religion. 
O happy times, this divine bond of wisdom and religion which you 
have protected whole, particularly among the Hebrews and 
Christians.  O then excessively unfortunate times, when the 
separation and wretched divorce of Pallas and Themis (that is, 
wisdom and honesty) happens.  Oh the horror, thus the holy gift is to 
be mangled by dogs.  Indeed, for the most part, the doctrine was 
transferred to the impious, where it has become, as much as possible, 
an instrument of evil and lewdness, and is said to be evil rather than 
science.  But the pearls of the most precious religion are often 
discussed by the ignorant and they [the pearls] are crushed as if by 
pigs.
83
  Indeed often it is seen: the laziness of the ignorant and the 
care of the lazy should be called superstition rather than religion.
84
 
Philosophy and religion had been thoroughly separated as a result of the scholastic tradition and 
impious religious officials.  Universities teaching theology focused on Christian revelation and those 
teaching philosophy, such as the Universities of Padua, were concerned mainly with Aristotle and 
Averroes.
85
  Ficino felt that there were many impious priests and churchmen, hence he wrote about 
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how to select the best people to appoint to religious duties.
86
  And yet, Ficino believed that it was 
possible to reunite religion and philosophy. 
O men, citizens of the heavenly Fatherland, and inhabitants of the 
earth, I beseech [you] that we might liberate philosophy, the sacred 
gift of God, from impiety, if we are able. But we are able if we are 
willing. Let us redeem the holy religion to the best of our abilities, 
from the accursed stupidity.  Therefore I pray and encourage all, 
indeed the philosophers, either so that they inwardly strive for or 




In a letter to the Venetian ambassador Antonio Zilioli, Ficino says that philosophy and religion are 
true sisters and presents the following argument: 
For it is the work of the true philosopher always to search out the 
particular principles and causes both of the parts and of the whole, 
and also to teach them; then in finding the real principles and causes 
of things he should finally ascend to the highest principle and cause 
of all.  Beyond this he should with all his powers lead everyone else 
with him to the realms above.  And as he shows how wisely the 
universe is ordered, it is likewise his work to demonstrate how it is 
arranged for the great benefit of mankind by the principles of 
providence that he has understood.  The whole universe in every part 
cries out that we should acknowledge and love God.  The true 
philosopher, intermediary between the universe and god, carefully 
points out and exhorts us to the same.  Therefore unless we are 
entirely deprived of every sense we must now openly acknowledge 
that nothing in the great order of the universe is at all accidental, 
except perhaps those men who suppose that so skilful a work itself is 
accidental!  Thus the philosopher should be called wise when he 
raises us to the contemplation of God, and pious and religious when 
he kindles within us the love of divine goodness.  For this reason the 
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Ficino‘s vision of prisca theologia is based on certain fundamental assumptions.  His faith in 
Christianity and one God was absolute; hence, he did not need to question or critically examine the 
tenets of his faith.  He believed that everything (corporeal and non-corporeal) came from God, the 
Good, the Ultimate One, and in God we find what we truly seek:  ―Certainly, all the time that we are 
pursuing merely one thing after another, we are running away from the One itself, which is 
everything.  But he who simply pursues the One itself, in that One soon attains everything.‖
89
  He 
assumed that while the philosophies and religions of the past claimed a God, really they were 
(without realizing it), proclaiming the singular Christian God.  He felt that even though Christianity 
appeared after their time, ancient writers were ‗hinting‘ at the truth to come.  ―Numenius, Iamblichus 
and Amelius, who did not condemn Christian theology, but rather they desired to imitate [it].‖
90
  By 
examining these ancient philosophies and religions, Ficino believed that it was possible to adapt, 
explain and mold their ‗wisdom‘ to demonstrate that philosophical (particularly Platonic) and 
religious knowledge shared a common foundation and that there was no conflict between religion and 
philosophy.  The unity of wisdom and the existence of eternal truths were also underlying 
assumptions. 
From this it can now be quite clear that philosophy in every part 
accords, as I have said, with the Godhead whole and perfect, and 
contains, so far as it is revealed to us, a full and complete image of 
the power, wisdom, and goodness of Father, Son and Spirit. Thus it 
is, that of all the faculties of men none appears closer or more similar 
to the Godhead than philosophy, and so nothing available to us, save 
God Himself, is seen as more perfect or more excellent. For which 
reason Hermes [Trismegistus] ... seems, through godlike power, to 
have explained this, when he declared that men become gods through 
the light of philosophy.
91
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If Christianity was to be recognized as the ultimate wisdom, thereby situating Christianity over all 
other religions, it must present the ancient wisdom, the inspired and revealed religion, and philosophy 
as consistent and mutually reinforcing.  Note that in this process Ficino did not worry about the 
authenticity of his sources.  He believed that these ancient writers were expressing eternal truths 
about God; therefore these truths could not be wrong no matter who wrote them down.  
This stability of truth was taken as proof of the eternity and 
immutability of the spirit.  The ontological priority of the spirit was 
based on its immutability; this immutability of the spirit was a divine 
attribute.  Participation in the eternal spirituality of truth was the 
condition of personal and individual spirituality. ...  Spirituality was 
the participation in the ideas of God.  If the human notion of God is 
eternal and necessary, then the necessity of God himself had to 
partake in the notion of necessity.
92
 
However, Ficino had a very specific orientation: Platonism and Christianity.  He drew a connection 
between Moses and Plato, noting that when Numenius (a Pythagorean philosopher) had read from the 
works of Plato and Moses, he declared ―that he had recognized Moses in Plato and that Plato was 
none other than a second Moses speaking in the Athenian tongue.‖
93
  This allowed Ficino to point out 
that the Christian theology of creation reflected Plato‘s philosophy, hence philosophy, in a sense, is 
an offspring of religion, and divine revelation is the source of philosophic truths.  He maintained this 
theme by also linking Socrates and Christ.  He enumerated the many parallels between the life, acts, 
and deaths of both men: they endured hardships such as hunger, exposure and poverty, extended love 
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Ficino hoped to emulate those before him who united the religious and philosophic.  He saw the 
ancients such as Hermes Trismegistus, Orpheus, and Pythagoras to have been both holy and wise, and 
wished himself to be seen in the same light.  He writes of himself: ―Next, it is so that you may 
understand why Marsilio, a follower of the ancients, always joins the religious with the philosophical 
to best of his ability, not only in this one book on religion ... but in all his writings.‖
95
  By using the 
writings and ideas of the ancient philosophers to give credence to his ideas about the elements of 
Christian theology, Ficino strove to close the rift and rejoin philosophy and religion through his 
works such Platonic Theology, De Christiana religione, and De raptu Pauli.  Ficino ignored, by 
omission, many works by earlier theologians and Popes, such as Anthony (father of monasticism 251 
– 356), Benedict (480 – 550), Boethius (480 – 524), Pope Gregory VII (1073 – 1085), and Francis of 
Assisi (1182 – 1226).  Excerpts of works by Augustine and Aquinas make appearances in Ficino‘s 
works, but he often relied on those writers he perceived as having been alive closer to the time of 
Christ (i.e. pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Eusebius).  One exception to this is Ficino‘s 
Commentary on the Letter to the Romans which has been studied extensively by Walter Dress, who 
has found that ―The whole organization of Ficino‘s work – argument, the order of ideas, the sentence 
structure – follows that of Aquinas.‖
96
 
Was Ficino writing Christian apologetic works?  He was not writing in the context of clarifying 
misunderstandings about literal readings of biblical passages.  Ficino was an apologist in the sense 
that he was working from the premise that people are rational beings.  By using well reasoned 
arguments, Ficino believed that these reasoning people could see the objective, well-reasoned truths 
about God and Christianity, thereby providing the basis for deciding that this religion was the only 
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reasonable choice and superior to all other religions.  He also believed that it was natural for all 
healthy, adult humans to believe in God, morality and destiny.
97
 
While many intellectuals in 15
th
 century Florence and Europe supported and accepted Ficino‘s 
ideas,
98
 this was not always the case.  Allen observes that occasionally in Ficino‘s writing we find  
a sense of being under attack, of guarding a truth that has ubiquitous 
and implacable foes confronting her: the bold but ineffective 
materialists and epicureans, the clandestine and therefore more 
dangerous sophists, mocking poets, pseudo-Aristotelians, Averroists.  
This defensiveness derived in part from the Platonic tradition with its 
persistent, perhaps originally Pythagorean sense of insiderness, of 
discipleship; of being the katharoi, whose enemies abounded and 
whose sacrificial victim had been Socrates.
99
 
There was questioning and pushback on his Platonic ideas from ecclesiastics and other Aristotelians, 
the poet Luigi Pulci, Johannes Pannonius (a Hungarian), and Ficino‘s former student Pico della 
Mirandola.  The politically challenging times, the plague, the charge of heresy, and the events 
surrounding Savonrola‘s time in Florence would have been stressful for Ficino.  Ficino was also 
challenged by personal issues, caring for various family members on a very limited income, bad 
health, and depression (reported by Ficino himself and the biographer Corsi).  Allen also suggests that 
Ficino struggled with ―a fatalistic impulse to believe, incompatible with his basic philosophical and 
ethical assumptions, that his physical and temperamental life was subject to the baleful starry 
configurations that reigned at his nativity when Saturn was in the house of Aquarius;‖
100
 however, he 
does also recognize that Ficino‘s primary program was in fact to bring Plato and other ancient 
authors‘ works back to prominence by translating and commenting upon said works - a program of 
‗revealment‘ and ‗correct interpretation‘ as he calls it. 
                                                     
97
 Ficino, 1576a, §III; Ficino, 2004, §XIV.9.2 
98
 Shepherd, p. 1 
99
 Allen, 1998, pp. ix-x 
100
 Ibid., p. x 
 
 31 
Allen wrote that Ficino was writing from a besieged mindset, ―one consonant with medieval 
Christianity‘s emphasis on the soul‘s being encompassed on every side by the powers of darkness and 
deceit.‖
101
  While this description is appropriate for Dante‘s Inferno, a close examination of Ficino‘s 
more theologically oriented works and letters show more of an emphasis on what is uplifting, great, 
and good.  One seldom finds references to evil, powers of darkness, or malign demons trying to 
deceive humans in his independent works, although he does discuss them in the context of Platonic 
works such as his commentary on Plato‘s Phaedrus.  His belief in the concordance of philosophy and 
religion means that philosophy directs humankind to the divine, and therefore, it is required for the 
reverence and worship of God. 
2.1 Ficino’s Philosophical Image of God 
Why is the image of God in Ficino's writings worthy of examination in a philosophical context?  As 
mentioned earlier, Ficino‘s notion of God has not been examined to see if he is successful in 
supporting his beliefs with good philosophical arguments.  Like all Christians of his time, Ficino 
believed that humankind was made in God‘s image.  In chapter 31 of De Christiana religione he 
states ―God has said ‗Let us make man according to our image and likeness‘, and he [Moses] 
supplies, ‗God made man‘.‖
102
  Then he uses another variation, near the end of the second last 
chapter: ―God has said ‗We make man in our image and likeness, and also many other things more 
illustrious‘.‖
103
  How humans view themselves, their constitution, composition and creation, their 
place in the world and cosmos, their purpose for living, and their responsibilities (to self and others) 
are all tied into a world view which is influenced by religious faith or lack thereof. 




 Ficino, 1576a, §XXXI  Dixit Deus faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, et subdit, fecit 
Deus hominem. 
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Ficino uses the image of God for a number of purposes, particularly in his efforts to give Platonic 
perspectives a Christian gloss.  The main sources used for examining Ficino's God image present 
themselves in De raptu Pauli, De Christiana religione, Praedicationes, Platonic Theology, some of 
his Platonic commentaries and many of his letters.  This thesis discusses the five main attributes of 
God, the relationship between humans and the divine, and Ficino's philosophical arguments for each.  
An examination of God‘s attributes helps to inform the arguments for how humanity is reflected as 
and made in God‘s image.  God created humans, and treats humankind better than the other creatures; 
therefore, we must be responsible, worship, etc.  Ficino uses the idea of a cycle to express a 
relationship where God‘s love descends to humankind and human love ascends back to God.  He 
believes that this relationship is unique to humanity (over the other earthly creatures) and that divine 
illumination, love and proper human behaviour are key features for the relationship to be successful. 
Religion is important to Ficino because ―[m]ost human pursuits usually separate us from the divine 
and yoke us to what is mortal, but religion releases us from the mortal and binds us again to the 
divine.‖
104
  He also believed that religion was unique to humans and was the only unchanging thing 
(just like a Platonic form) in humans, although there could be minor differences of ideas between 
men: 
If religion were empty, men would be the most imperfect of all 
[animals] because of it, since through it he would be the most 
demented and most miserable. ... But it is obvious that such is the 
claim of religion not only from the fact that it belongs to man alone 
and to every man, but also from the fact that apart from a certain 
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Religion affects humans as they should be thinking of God daily, and yet, Ficino believes that only 
the right kind of person may practice both philosophy and religion: ―The eternal wisdom of God 
established the divine mysteries, at least in accordance with the beginnings of religion itself, to be 
discussed only by those ones who might be the true lovers of true wisdom.‖
106
  Ficino did not believe 
humans were forever tainted by original sin, but instead took a very positive view of humankind, 
although due to a person‘s free will, evil could come from humans (but this tendency was likely 
influenced by an evil daemon or an unfortunate alignment of the planets).  The immortality of the 
soul was not a formally recorded church doctrine in Ficino‘s time, but it was widely discussed and 
accepted in medieval theology and philosophy.  The main theme of his Platonic Theology was to 
prove the immortality of the human soul.  Incidentally, this work had a significant impact as it was 
one of the primary sources used by the Lateran Council of 1512/13, which formally confirmed the 
immortality of the human soul as Catholic church dogma.  If every human soul is immortal, then the 
value of each person‘s relationship with God must be emphasized, enhanced, and well reasoned so 
that the arguments would resonate with everyone.  If God is immortal and eternal, and the human soul 
is most like God, then the soul must be immortal.  Ficino believes that the human soul strives to 
reunite permanently with God, otherwise, what is the point of living if not to make the soul better for 
the purpose of joining God in the eternal immortal realm?  This notion is part of what has become 
recognized as one of the Renaissance themes, the glorification of man.  Ficino sought to use 
philosophy and Christian theology to further enhance the perception of human dignity.  His overall 
concept of God is very different from the common view today. 
A number of biblical passages refer to humankind as the image of God, yet there is no definition or 
description of God's image in the Christian Bible.  The Bible does provide some analogies to get us 
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closer to the idea, such as ―God is light.‖  If humans are created in God's image, we are somehow like 
God.  Ficino does not have an explicit piece on the image of God, so we must seek out where he 
sought to identify and further explain what God is, what the similarities between God and humankind 
might be, and how we may also become more like God. 
In the Bible we find the most famous image of God in Genesis 1:26-27: ―Then God said, ‗Let us 
make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of 
the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, 
and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.‘  So God created humankind in his image, in 
the image of God he created them; male and female he created them.‖  Also from Genesis comes: 
―This is the list of the descendants of Adam.  When God created humankind, he made them in the 
likeness of God.  Male and female he created them, and he blessed them and named them 
‗Humankind‘ when they were created‖
107
 and ―[w]hoever sheds the blood of a human, by a human 
shall that person's blood be shed; for in his own image God made humankind.‖
108
  Other biblical 
verses referring to the image of God are Genesis 9:6, 1 Corinthians 11:7 and 15:4, Isaiah 40:18 and 
Wisdom 2:23.  As previously mentioned, Ficino does make explicit reference to portions of Genesis 
1:26-27 in De Christiana religione.  At this time I have not yet found any of the other ‗image of God‘ 
bible passages quoted in the works of Ficino.   
Given that Ficino‘s ontology is thoroughly hierarchical, it helps to understand that the celestial 
hierarchy of pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite appears to be a primary source for Ficino.  According 
to pseudo-Dionysius, 
[A] hierarchy is a sacred order, a state of understanding and an 
activity approximating as closely as possible to the divine. ... The 
goal of a hierarchy, then, is to enable beings to be as like as possible 
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to God and to be at one with him.  A hierarchy has God as its leader 
of all understanding and action.  It is forever looking directly at the 
comeliness of God.  A hierarchy bears in itself the mark of God.  
Hierarchy causes its members to be images of God in all respects, to 
be clear and spotless mirrors reflecting the glow of primordial light 
and indeed to God himself.  It ensures that when its members have 
received this full and divine splendor they can then pass on this light 
generously and in accordance with God‘s will to beings further down 
the scale. ...  Therefore when the hierarchic order lays it on some to 
be purified and on others to do the purifying, on some to receive 
illumination and on others to cause illumination, on some to be 
perfected and on others to bring about perfection, each will actually 
imitate God in the way suitable to whatever role it has.
109
 
The themes of being like God, being one with God, hierarchy members bearing the image of God, 
divine illumination, and descent and ascent form the foundation of Ficino‘s philosophically religious 
writing and will be examined in the chapters to come. 
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The Main Attributes of God 
The five most central and traditional attributes of God, as noted by Gerard Hughes
110
, are existence, 
simplicity, goodness, omniscience and omnipotence.  These attributes have been used by numerous 
theologians and writers since the beginning of Christianity and at various times Ficino draws them 
into some of his writings.  In the Appendix to the Platonic Theology, Ficino provides the following 
description of God and attributes it to the Platonists: 
What is God therefore?  He is the rational principle of rational 
principles and the fount of things, the artificer of all, the uniform and 
omniform form
111
, the immobile substance moving all, the rest in 
motion, the eternity in time, the continuous in space, in the heights 
the depth, in the depths the height, the unity in multiplicity, in 
weakness the power, the most fertile nature of natures, the most 
natural fertility of fertilities, the eternal life of living things and of 
lives, the light of sense and sensibles, and the perspicacity of the 
senses, the sense sensing in the outer rinds of the very pith of 
sensibles and in the pith the outer rinds, and such an understanding 
that it is itself the goodness of the things to be understood and the 
truth of every intellect and the joy of the will.
112
 
In this chapter these five attributes will be used to give a focus to the examination of Ficino‘s notions 
about God. 
3.1 Ficino’s Proofs for God’s Existence 
As discussed earlier, one of Ficino‘s fundamental assumptions is that God exists and that ―No one 
denies the existence of God.
113
  If God‘s non-existence had been definitively proven, there is nothing 
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that Ficino could have written to describe God, but this is not the case.  Ficino‘s notion that God‘s 
existence is necessary and is one of his essential attributes was common for his time.  In fact, he 
thought it blasphemous of anyone to think that ―God exists and acts by chance.‖
114
  Later 
philosophers such as Hume and Kant
115
 were critical of this assumption and worked to show that the 
proof of the existence of a necessary existent being is a logical error; however Ficino had no interest 
in proving that God does not exist. 
Although Ficino presents a limited number of arguments to support the Christian notion of God‘s 
existence, these are not pure arguments for it, but rather claims for the sense in which God exists.  In 
his De raptu Pauli, he uses arguments of affirmation and negation about God‘s existence and nature: 
It is true that what you see in this [third] heaven, you are not able to 
speak [of] – that is to proclaim and affirm this absolutely.  As often 
as you deny other things about God, thus whenever you are 
discoursing about God, speaking thus: ―God is not any body, nor the 
quality nor the soul nor the angel of a body,‖ nor are you truly 
denying if that thing is considered more highly.  Whenever you 
relate other things to God, thus comparing: God is the beginning, 
because from him all [things] emanate; God is the end, because all 
[things] flow back to him; God is life and intelligence, because 
through him souls live and minds understand; likewise you are truly 
relating.  But if you will have affirmed, ―God himself is in himself, 
absolutely, this very one which I have either discovered or thought‖ 
you will be greatly deceived.  Obviously if he is greater than you, 
that highest one, the originator of all, he is not able to be that which, 
circumscribed by your intellect, is concluded to be the limit.  If the 
beginning of the beginnings and the end of the ends is infinite, he is 
not any of these which devised and comprehended by you are now 
seen [by you] to be finite.
116
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With the negation argument Ficino is demonstrating that God is not matter or quality (i.e., not 
corporeal), nor is God motion (i.e., like a soul or angel).  In his argument by affirmation, God is the 
beginning and end of a cycle which is in part a reflection of the medieval celestial hierarchy of his 
time.  God is also the ‗prime mover‘ and seminal cause of life, intelligence and soul.  God does not 
exist in the way that our limited minds exist or think, but God ‗is‘ beyond and above all in the sense 
that one can conceive of nothing greater.
117
 
At the end of the same work, there is a weak argument for God‘s existence (where God is seen in the 
guise of joy or eternal blessing): 
If everyone did everything for the sake of avoiding sorrow and 
pursing joy, and they reject life itself without joy itself, manifestly 
joy is the end of all things and it is therefore also the beginning: by 
what indeed are all things moved, since all things are moved and 
become.  Therefore what else is that very joy except God?
118
 
In this argument, joy is the final cause for humans.  God is the source of joy because every thing must 
have a source, joy is the final cause for humans, and as God is the beginning and end of joy, God 
exists.  At times, but not frequently, Ficino uses arguments leaning on the four causes.  He believes 
that ―So wherever one discovers or conceives of what is a universal effect, there God is present who 
is the universal cause.  And wherever there is a product which necessarily comes into being through 
one specific cause and without an intermediary, there God must be the cause of it.‖
119
  In a discussion 
of why the soul is independent of matter, Ficino discusses the four causes of things: material, formal, 
efficient and final.  The human material cause is the body and the soul is our formal cause.  Humans 
have two efficient causes, universal nature and ‗man,‘ and happiness (joy) is the final cause. 
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As part of his fifth proof that the soul is independent of matter, Ficino lists the ―four causes of natural 
things: efficient, final, material and formal.  The efficient cause of a man is universal nature and a 
man; the final cause is human happiness; the material cause is body; the formal cause is soul.‖
120
  God 
exists without any cause and does not have any of the four natural causes.  Given that humans exist 
due to a cause, we must exist through another and that other is God.  Does the nature of God have any 
type of cause in Ficino‘s works?  His Platonic Theology provides the best answer: 
Whenever something is said to exist through itself, it means it exists 
without a cause. ... God alone exists through Himself such that He 
exists without any cause.  He exists entirely through Himself, 
therefore, in that He excludes from Himself the four genera of 
causes. ... Below God nothing can exist which is without efficient 
cause and end, for the one God is the creator and end of all things.  
So nothing will be found other than God which can properly be said 




For Ficino, God is the first cause or, in Aristotle‘s term, the prime mover.  If there is a cause from 
which all follows, this implies a hierarchy of some sort below God.  One of his clearest statements on 
the hierarchical orders differing by degree also comes from the Platonic Theology: 
So we must proceed step by step from the four contraries to their 
four opposites by three and by two, so that, just as we rise from four 
causes for body and three causes for quality, so we may rise from 
three causes for quality to two causes for the third essence. 
Wherefore this essence will have an efficient and final cause only, 




For Ficino, humans perceive themselves to exist and likewise assume that God exits, so he tries to 
find examples in the natural world to demonstrate this belief.  In his book De Christiana religione, he 
argues for God‘s existence by analogy and from effect to cause: ―Indeed so as the Sun is not 
discerned without Sun, and as air is not heard without air, and the eye full of light sees the light, the 
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ear filled with air hears the air resonating, thus neither is God recognized without God.‖
 123
  His 
argument from analogy implies that there must be a source for the ideas we have (i.e., the sun gives 
rise to the idea of light), so there must be a God to give us the idea that God exists.  Finally God‘s 
existence is necessary and forever.  Ficino argues that God is everlasting, outside of time and an 
absolutely necessary being because 
[t]he stronger the power by which anything endures and is preserved, 
the longer that thing lasts.  If this is so, then God by His infinite 
power endures Himself and preserves all other things to infinity. ... 
Again if God exists totally beyond movement and time, then He does 
not sustain change within time and mutate with regard to being and 
non-being from an earlier to a later state.  If God is absolutely 




Ficino was a firm believer in God‘s existence, so he did not concentrate on writing proofs for God‘s 
existence.  His statements from De raptu Pauli and Platonic Theology do not provide any novel 
arguments for God‘s existence.  Next we examine Ficino‘s arguments about the other four attributes 
of God, for which there is more material for discussion. 
3.2 Ficino’s Arguments about God’s Simplicity 
With God‘s existence assumed to be true, but not well proven by Ficino, are his claims about God‘s 
simplicity well-supported philosophically?  The concept that God was unity or simplicity was part of 
the medieval theology prior to and during Ficino‘s time.  If God‘s existence is first among attributes, 
then God as single, simple or unity is the next most important as it is from this that the other attributes 
must necessarily follow.  If God is simple, there is no difference between God and his essence.  If 
God is simplicity, there are no parts, so there is no distinction between God and his attributes (e.g., 
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omnipotence or omniscience).  If God is the only true unity, God has total independence from 
everything different and distinct from himself. 
Ficino‘s longest sustained argument about the unity of God is found in the Platonic Theology: 
[S]omething else must exit above angel that is not only motionless 
but entirely one and simple.  This is God, the most powerful of all in 
that He is the simplest of all.  Since union consists in simplicity, and 
power in unity, no one would dare say that God is compounded from 
many things, because if God were compounded correctly, he would 
consist of something resembling a substrate and of something else 
resembling a form.  In that case, God would not be in every respect 
the most perfect, since one part in Him would be less perfect than the 
other and both parts less perfect than the whole.  Nor would God be 
the highest agent, because He would do whatever he does, not by 
way of His whole self, but by way of one of His parts, the form.  Nor 
would he be most blessed, because He would not be delighting 
everywhere in Himself; for He would not be embracing His whole 
self in every part.  He would be seeing something in Himself other 
than God, since the part and the whole are not the same.
125
 
This argument places God in the highest position of the medieval celestial hierarchy.  Ficino uses the 
‗whole-is-greater-than-the-sum-of-the-parts‘ argument and points out that God‘s omnipotence and 
omniscience are derived from unity.  Another of his arguments for God as unity is based on the 
authority of the Platonists giving a series of statements about why God is one. 
God then is the single agent who gives order to the single universe. 
... God is one, by the Platonists‘ first argument, because He is unity.  
... God is one, by the Platonists‘ second argument, because He is 
truth. The highest truth is one. ... God is one, by the Platonists‘ third 
argument, because He is the highest goodness.
 126
 
With this argument, Ficino has added goodness and truth to God‘s attributes, and these are also 
founded on the notion of God‘s unity.  He follows Augustine in this (as did everyone else in his time).  
Ficino disagrees with the Gnostics and Manichaeans who say that there are two gods, one good and 
one evil.  He believes that God is goodness and cannot be a source of evil because ―just as God, who 
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is the author of good things, is the highest good and totally without evil, so His opposite is the highest 
evil, deprived of all good.‖
127
  In his De raptu Pauli, he clearly positions evil below God in the 
celestial hierarchy when he writes ―But go further, if what you think [is] below the order of things, 




Another difference in the ideas about the one and the many arise over the concept of mind.  It was an 
ongoing debate
129
 during the Renaissance between those who agreed and disagreed with Averroes‘ 
theory
130
 that there is one material intellect (below God) participated in by everyone.  In his Long 
Commentary on De Anima Averroes wrote that the human intellect is eternal but that there is only one 
intellect for all human kind.  A brief summary of his theory is that it is matter that differentiates 
individuals; minds are not matter; therefore, all minds are one.  Two of the premises that this theory 
relies on are that the material intellect is hierarchically above the human species and that if two 
humans are thinking about the same intelligible, they must be drawing on the same intelligible found 
in the material intellect; otherwise, it would be impossible for two people to consider the same 
intelligible at the same time.  From Averroes‘ formulation of the material intellect it followed that 
individual humans do not exist in any manner after death, although life continues for other members 
of the species so long as other members physically exist.  Ficino believes the soul is immortal, every 
human is an individual and has their own intellect, so there is no shared intellect of any kind: ―In one 
man the intellect is very learned, and in another, untaught; in this man just and honourable, in that 
unjust and dishonourable; here happy, there miserable.  It cannot therefore be the same intellect in all 
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men.  If the intellects of men are diverse, their souls are much more so.‖
131
  If people are to be in 
God‘s image, humankind cannot share one intellect as each human is a slightly different image of 
God (hence the multiplicity of humans).  Ficino argues that 
[j]ust as Averroes‘ words produce a superfluous assumption in these 
three kinds of knowledge, so do they in the three kinds of forming.  
If the receptive intellect has once been formed by the agent intellect 
through essence, as he supposes, it is superfluous to have it forever 
being formed anew by that same agent intellect through the images 
of all men; and also superfluous to have it being formed by that same 
intellect daily through the images [solely] of wise and happy men.
132
 
This is one of the arguments found in the Platonic Theology where Ficino provides five proofs and 
multiple arguments against Averroes‘ theory of one intellect.  Ficino‘s remaining arguments on this 
topic are left for readers to explore on their own, since this topic falls beyond the remit of this thesis. 
Leaving Averroes and continuing on with the idea of God relating to all humans, of particular interest 
for the examination of God‘s simplicity is Ficino‘s argument that relates the unity of God and 
multiplicity of people.  ―Furthermore, since God is not mixed with anything, He is the particular 
leader of no one thing but the common leader of all.‖
133
  For Ficino, the unity of God is the very 
quality that enables the human connection with God.  In his De Christiana religione he argues thus: 
Moreover, it is fitting [that] the whole creation, in a certain way [is] 
to be joined with God the common leader of all, (indeed not scattered 
here and there), because God is the highest unity.  I might even say 
therefore, God ought to be united to humankind‘s nature (as taken all 
together), in which all things are.  If it were joined with these things 
above it as if to the limits of created things, a union of this sort 
would not extend to either the middles of things nor to the other 
extremes.  Similarly if he was joining himself with those ones which 
are below us, surely the infinite unity has united with extreme 
diligence, his very many works both reciprocally and to himself, 
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since from the beginning he has included all in humans, then he will 
have closely united humankind to himself.
134
 
If one is going to have a celestial hierarchy with one God above all, by the time one travels down 
through the hierarchies to humans, there has to be many humans.  Humans must also have their own 
individual intellects for Ficino‘s ideas about human free will and individual salvation to be valid. 
So if God is simplicity, how can God also be described as a trinity?  Ficino has many discussions 
about God and the Trinity.  Ficino believed that the neoplatonists and their interpretation of the trinity 
was not the true Christian sense of the triune God because they viewed the Trinity as three 
substances, not as consubstantial.
135
  In addition to his differences with the neoplatonists, Ficino also 
believes Mohammed is in error about the relation of God, the Spirit and Jesus with the Trinity: 
And in the Qur’an he detests this double numbering of gods which is 
also foreign to Christians who think that Father, Son, and Spirit are 
one God.  However, he himself, stirred by the miracles of Christ, 
(although he did not know how) confesses him to be the Son of God 
and God born of a perpetual virgin with God‘s breath, where he 
names him [the Son] the breath and the spirit of God, the very soul of 
God, the virtue of God, the word of God.  Besides, how often he runs 
into the name of the Trinity, a man absolutely ignorant of so great a 
thing, wrongly he misrepresents Christians, excessively and 
unsuitably, that they honour three gods, while he does not know how 
to distinguish the qualities of the divine persons while at the same 
time protecting the unity of the divine substance.  Yet he himself 
compelled by the truth, introduces God speaking about himself 
everywhere in the plural number.  This is something Moses himself 
had observed in Genesis, he attributed to God sometimes the singular 
name and sometimes the plural term, surely protecting the unity of 
substance in God and likewise the number of persons.
136
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Ficino‘s views on the many (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) and the one (Trinity) follow the traditional 
Christian belief of his time, that the entities of the Trinity are consubstantial.  Ficino follows 
Augustine in believing that it is possible to demonstrate that the Trinity can be understood through 
reason (this differs from Aquinas and many other medieval thinkers).  One of Ficino‘s clearest 
arguments about the value of this arrangement in the Trinity comes from his De raptu Pauli: 
If any of the three things is equally infinite, they are also equal and 
most like among themselves.  If the infinite nature and fullness, 
when it leaves nothing outside of itself and comprehends its whole 
self inwardly, then it cannot but be one.  Single is the nature of the 
trinity, and most simple.  If however it must be the most powerful, as 
power exists in union so weakness exists in division.  Now therefore, 
o soul, the triple and single, a single spirit with intellect, will, [and] 
constant memory, you have climbed up the ether together with me, to 
the single and triple heaven.
137
 
The power of the unity will be weakened by division, even though it is like three powers and three 
persons in one entity: 
Moreover only in God and as if always, the sacred scriptures join the 
plural with the singular, because namely in him alone there is one 
nature and three persons, and in him there are not only three 
strengths, just as in the artist, but also three persons in a certain 
wonderful way distinct from one another and united.
138
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
modo, tamen miraculis Christi commotus, ipsum Dei filium Deumque fatetur, ubi eum nominat Dei flatum 
spiritumque, propriam Dei animam, virtutem Dei, verbum Dei, afflante Deo, ex virgine perpetua natum.  
Praeterea, quotiens incidit in Trinitatis nomen, homo tantae rei prorsus ignarus, Christianos falso nimium, et 
inepte calumniatur, quod tres Deos adorent, nesciens proprietates divinarum distinguere personarum ac simul 
servare divinae substantiae unitatem, ipse tamen veritate coactus, Deum ubique in plurali numero de se 
loquentem inducit, quod et Moses observaverat, qui in Genesi Deo, modo singulare nomen, verbumque modo 
plurale attribuit, certe unitatem substantiae in Deo servans simul ac numerum personarum.  
137
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This is a rather weak argument by analogy comparing the three powers of the artist to God the 
creator.  In De raptu Pauli, God is presented as the ‗single source‘ who acts infinitely, and the reason 
is the Platonic forms. 
But behold I see a certain commonality in the machine of the 
universe: mass.  I consider the diverse forms in the mass.  I know the 
one to be formed mass, the other forms to be forming, and because I 
understand this mass as the foundation that precedes the forms with a 
certain order, and I separate the mass from these with my mind and I 
envision it to be dispersed or to be collected separately into the point.  
But I protect whatever forms I am able [to].  But to what purpose do 
I protect them?  In a certain essence common to all.  In fact, all 
convene in common in him because they exist.  [They convene] in 
the indivisible essence, I say, the absolutely indivisible forms.  
Indeed now we have removed the dimensions from them all.  
Moreover, I want one form to exist here from whatever species of 
things.  And just as all the natural forms which by a certain 
participation are such, or such that are per se infinite gathered in a 
single subject that is passive, i.e. in prime matter: so all which are 
such by their essence, i.e. I wish the natures of the forms be brought 
together and I see [them] in a single source acting per se infinitely.
139
 
While God is infinitely forming and sourcing, humans must be distinguishable from God yet 
somehow remain connected to God.  Through a description of why God in not multiple, Ficino 
connects the many (man) to the one (God) when he writes that ―Indeed God does not become 
properly the natural form of man, but man becomes the proper and conjoined instrument of God for 
completing the proper works of God most distinguishedly.‖
140
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A slightly better argument in De Christiana religione has God as a unity, the ultimate good and the 
source of the good: ―And let this substance – unity that is true and good, truth that is one and good, 
goodness that is one and true – be the one, the good, the true God.‖
141
  This is a very simple argument 
taking the form of 
P1: U = T + G 
P2: T = U + G 
C:  G = U + T 
This argument provides one basis for the human/divine cyclical relationship as Ficino then goes on to 
say 
Because He is unity, He is truth; because He is true unity, He is 
goodness.  He enfolds all in unity, He unfolds all in truth, He pours 
forth all in goodness.  After all things have issued from Him, they 
flow back again through goodness, are reformed through truth, [and] 
are restored to oneness through unity.
142
 
Here we find a representation of the Platonic notion that unchanging goods are superior to changing 
goods.  God‘s immortal, unchanging unity provides a home, a place where human souls can stop 
moving and find peace and rest.  The unity of God leading to his goodness segues into a discussion on 
the goodness of God. 
3.3 Ficino’s Arguments about the Goodness of God 
As seen in some of the preceding arguments, God as goodness is a result of God‘s unity.  The 
Platonic notion of the Good appears frequently in Ficino‘s statements about God and a variety of his 
works.  For example in the Platonic Theology we find ―Thus God has understanding not only of 
genera and species, as some have claimed, but of individual things as well.  For knowledge of each 
individual thing is desirable as a good, and God lacks nothing that is good.‖
143
  In De raptu Pauli, he 
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states ―in order that you might see that invisible one who is everywhere, just as he is in the third 
[heaven], and if he is anywhere, chiefly he is rather in the supreme heaven.‖
144
  In De Christiana 
religione, Ficino says that ―Indeed God is the force, the wisdom and the immeasurable goodness.‖
145
  
Ficino is very clear that God and the good are different, and yet God is the ultimate exemplar of 
goodness to be desired by those hierarchically below. 
Moreover, given that all things desire the good, if another principle 
exists above the good, we should ask whether they do or do not 
desire it.  If they are said to desire it, it follows that they seek 
something beyond and greater than the good.  If we deny they desire 
it, we would be saying – and this is folly – that effects do not desire 
the first cause by which they are preserved.   Indeed, even goodness 
itself would be forced to seek a higher principle, although that is 
absurd; for every reason for desiring is embraced by goodness itself.  
Therefore nothing exists above goodness which can be loved. 
Therefore there is no principle above it.  So the absolute unity, truth, 
and goodness we find above angel constitute, as Plato believed, the 
universal principle. It is the one, true and good God.
146
 
This argument is entirely consistent with his argument for God‘s unity as seen earlier in §3.2 of this 
thesis.  Ficino followed the medieval hypothesis that the good and being are synonymous: if it is good 
to exist, and something exists, it is good.  Anselm‘s cosmological argument
147
 states that goodness 
must have an origin.  Thus, by extension if it has an origin and good things exist, it follows that an 
ultimate good also exists.  If God is the ultimate good, then God must be the originator who creates 
everything else that is good.  Which leads back to, if good things exist, it follows that there must be a 
source of good. 
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As discussed in §3.2, God is without evil and evil is below God in the medieval celestial hierarchy.  
In his commentary on Plato‘s Parmenides, Ficino furthers the cause of good in one of his rare 
discussions about evil: 
Evils have no ideal model in the presence of God. ... Indeed, God 
would be evil if He had His own Idea of evil, for God Himself is 
every Idea.  But when Plato says that the architect of the world 
wanted to make everything as similar as possible to Himself, yet 
nothing evil but everything supremely good, he is clearly 




Discussing the good in De raptu Pauli, Ficino suggests we should pursue the good and will someday 
be able to overtake it if we live our lives correctly.  In his view, our desire for the good is innate and 
we must go through many goods to get to the ultimate good: 
In the order of the world, as you know, all things are good, especially 
because they are beautifully and usefully arranged, and naturally 
they desire the good.  If all good in the order of things comes 
together in the one certain good common {shared} nature, in which 
all goods are one good, then necessarily in the power of the ordainer 
of things, the one good is every good.  That sound nature is the 
common and one, which lies in the multitude of all, and is contained 
by the all, emanates from one certain form, which is in it itself, over 
the entire multitude, and it contains all.
149
 
If the desire for the good is truly innate in us, as Ficino assumes, then the desire for the good helps 
humans participate in the human/divine relationship and motivates humans to try to achieve the 
reunion with God.  Ficino makes claims about God‘s goodness and how it relates to one and many 
goods, and the connection goodness helps to provide between God and humans, but there are no 
strong philosophical arguments about God‘s goodness.  His works are laden with many references to 
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the good, God as the ultimate good and God as the source of all good, but a thorough study of Ficino 
and the good is beyond the scope and focus of this thesis.  If God is immortal, the highest good, and 
infinite with some of his goodness pouring forth to all below, God must have infinite wisdom to be 
able to recognize and then dispense his goodness to all lower creations. 
3.4 Ficino’s Discussions of God’s Omniscience 
In De Christiana religione, Ficino writes that ―God, who is infinite wisdom, goodness [and] clarity, is 
not able to be ignorant, ungrateful or cruel‖
150
 and thereby links infinite wisdom with goodness.  
Ficino has no direct proofs or arguments about God‘s omniscience, but evidence of his thoughts about 
it can be derived from his arguments about infinite wisdom, humans as a microcosm of the cosmos, 
and God seeing all. 
In a letter, Ficino describes God as ―the everlasting fountain of all wisdom.‖
151
  In another letter about 
happiness, he describes the value of wisdom to humans and then relates this to God, the source of 
wisdom: 
Of everything that is ours, wisdom alone is good in itself.  Only 
ignorance is bad in itself.  Since therefore we all wish to be happy, 
and happiness cannot be obtained without the right use of our gifts, 
and since knowledge reveals their proper use, we should leave all 
else aside and strive with the full support of philosophy and religion 
to become as wise as possible.  For thus our soul becomes most like 
to God, who is wisdom itself.
152
 
Ficino appeals to philosophy‘s authority to explain God‘s knowledge, ―True reason teaches us that 
God knows not only individual things – even the lowest – but also things infinite.‖
153
  Which is 
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related to an earlier statement in the Platonic Theology: ―Understanding is desirable as a good.  For 
through understanding each thing can enjoy itself and everything else.‖
154
 
Ficino‘s definition of truth is almost like a Platonic ‗form‘ and illustrates why truth is essential to 
God‘s omniscience. 
I consider that which does not vary to be nothing other than truth.  
Indeed, truth itself is so totally unmoving that the truth even of movement 
is unmoving. ... Truth is such that it can never be other than itself.  
Consequently, truth is eternally present and neither passes from the past 
into the present nor flows from the present into the future. ...  Truth is so 
eternal that even if it is said to have had a beginning at some time, it 
would certainly have been true before the beginning at some time, it 
would certainly have been true before the beginning of time, and it would 
not have been true except through the same truth, that truth itself would at 
some time be. ...  If truth is unmoving in movement, if it is present in past 
and future, it if is in the beginning without a beginning, if likewise in the 




His argument is: truth does not vary, truth is unmoving, truth cannot be false (or otherwise); therefore, 
truth is eternally present.  The lack of time is an important element in God‘s omniscience, while for 
humans, time is a factor.  Ficino describes the human prophets‘ knowledge of the past and future as 
something that comes from God‘s omniscience: ―Why are the prophets speaking about things which 
are future often as though they are past?  Because in the divine mind, to which they are all present, 
they see as present the present and after they have seen them, they see them as the past, that is, they 
speak of them as manifest and already complete.‖
156
 
If God is with you and within you, this is equivalent to omniscience.  It is as though the infinite God 
is in the finite human, and yet God‘s knowledge of an individual human means that the finite is also 
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in the infinite.  This idea is often called the microcosm/macrocosm.  Ficino retains the medieval 
notion of man as a microcosm of the hierarchical universe.  During a discussion of the steps to reach 
God in the third heaven, Ficino writes that 
[K]now how in you who are a small world, there are three spirits: the 
natural in the liver, the vital in the heart, and the animal in the brain, 
where only you perceive the finite light.  Thus around this very large 
world exist three armies of divine spirits, as if [they are] the three 




He also employs the microcosm/macrocosm concepts with individual persons and their relationship 
with God.  In his letter to Michele Mercati of San Miniato, where God is speaking to Ficino‘s soul 
I am indeed with you, because I am in you; I am in you, because you 
are in me. … Your father is the least of all things in size, just as he is 
the greatest of all things in excellence; and since he is very small he 
is within everything, but since he is very great he is outside 
everything.  See, I am here with you, both within and without, the 
greatest smallness and the smallest greatness. … I fill heaven and 
earth, I penetrate and contain them. I fill and am not filled, for I am 
fullness itself. I penetrate and am not penetrated, for I am the power 
of penetration itself.  I contain and am not contained, for I am 
containing itself.  I, who am fullness itself, am not filled, for that 
would not be worthy of me.  I am not penetrated lest I cease to exist, 
being myself existence.  I am not contained lest I cease to be God, 
who is infinity itself. … I pass into everything unmingled, so that I 
may surpass all; for I am excellence itself.  I excel everything 
without being separate, so that I am also able to enter and permeate 
at the same time, to enter completely and to make one, being unity 




In speaking about God Ficino finds that God can be in humans, but still be different from us: ―[W]e 
recognize that we remain in God and himself in us, because he has given to us from his spirit and we 
both see and testify that the father has sent his son, the saviour of the world, and we have recognized 
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[him] and we have believed the truth, which God has in us.‖
159
  In the preceding sentence, Ficino is 
using ‗to see‘ in the sense of ‗to understand‘ and does so interchangeably in his writing, much like we 
do today when we say ‗I see‘ but really mean ‗I understand.‘  He wrote that ―All eyes comes next, 
meaning all the powers of the soul which are concerned with knowing.‖
160
  In Book II of his 
Epistolae, one letter, entitled ―God sees all and creates all,‖ expands on God‘s power.  The reader 
must also keep in mind that Ficino often uses the sun to represent God,
161
 
If the light of the sun by which the eye sees the Sun had an eye, 
certainly while our eye sees itself, it sees itself also much more 
clearly because all clarity emanates from it, it would look at our eye 
in return.  And yet we doubt, whether that divine eye by which also 
proximately and which the eyes of our minds see everywhere, [the 
divine eye] itself may in turn see ours?  Surely we would nowhere 
see anything, unless it [divine eye] sees us who by continually seeing 
us,  always illuminates us, and by illuminating gives us the power 
and act of seeing.  Just as we do not see anything unless the light of 
the Sun painted the colours and shapes of all things, we who 
certainly understand nothing beyond the light of the highest 
intelligible, filled all around with colours and shapes of all things.
162
 
Similarly, one finds in the Platonic Theology, 
God sees and can do infinite things over and beyond those that exist 
in nature.  For if the mind does not understand God‘s substance, it 
certainly does not understand either His understanding or His power, 
and therefore all those things which God both understands and is 
able to do. ... Accordingly it is proper that the divine mind, in 
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everywhere contemplating itself, sees more and sees subject to more 
rational principles than any [created] intellect may see.
163
 
These views are consistent with what he wrote in De Christiana religione: ―God always sees men 
with the intellect, but in addition he has seen with [his] eyes.‖
164
  In De raptu Pauli, in a discussion on 
the nine choirs of angels and their relation to humans, Ficino says that ―To this all blessed spirits 
continually direct the eyes of the mind.‖
165
  This idea is derived from the formulation of the medieval 
celestial hierarchy.  In the following passage, phantasy should be understood to mean imagination: 
A higher power should know all that a lower power knows and more.  
This is clear in the case of our own souls.  What each of our five 
senses perceives separately our phantasy discerns in summary 
fashion and to some extent more excellently.  What the phantasy sees 
in many images, the intellect sees in a single image and more clearly: 
it sees the individual objects that the phantasy sees, but in addition it 
sees the universal rational principles which the phantasy is unaware 
of.  Thus God with one power knows everything we come to know 
with three powers, that is, with the senses, the phantasy, and the 
intellect.  Therefore God sees universal and individual things.
166
 
Omniscience is akin to knowledge of all true propositions.  Ficino includes God‘s ‗future‘ knowledge 
(what humans would call foreknowledge) in a way does that not conflict with human free will.  God 
can know the future without conflict with human free will, given that God is not temporal and knows 
all knowable things for any time.  God‘s knowledge does not depend on causal processes as Ficino 
believes that God is the first cause.  God causes processes, not the other way around, and processes do 
not cause God, hence God‘s existence does not depend on causal processes. 
As final note on God‘s omniscience and human free will, while Ficino‘s writing is often in accord 
with Augustine‘s, one major area of difference was fate.  Augustine held that a person‘s fate was 
predetermined by God, while Ficino felt it was up to the individual person to choose a path to God or 
                                                     
163
 Ficino, 2006b, §XVIII.8 p. 149; the editors note that Ficino is following Aquinas Summa contra Gentiles 
3.56.2326 
164
 Ficino, 1576a, §XXXIIII  Videt semper Deus homines intellectu, sed oculis insuper vidit. 
165
 Ficino, 1495, DRP f. LXVr  Huc omnes beati spiritus assidue oculos mentis intendunt. 
166
 Ficino, 2001, §II.9 
 
 55 
go astray.  Ficino believes that humans have free will and that it is truly free because ―For just as He 
foresees what you are going to do, so He foresees that you are going to do it voluntarily and 
freely.‖
167
  In a religious context, this argument works as follows ―God does not force men to 
salvation.  He has begat [man] free who, from the beginning, but with constant inspirations, he gently 
draws each one.‖
168
  People‘s free will to choose their soul‘s ultimate destination is consistent with 
the lofty Renaissance view of humans.  Ficino‘s expression of such Renaissance humanist truths was 
likely inspired, in part, by his translation of the Corpus Hermeticum.
169
 
3.5 Ficino’s Proofs of God’s Omnipotence 
Ficino believes that God‘s power arises because of his goodness.  ―God is what He is such that He 
could not be something else, because He is, so to speak, all being and all power; or rather, He would 
not want to be something else because He is all good.‖
170
  God‘s unlimited power is also derived from 
his unity.  Ficino argues that ―Just as extreme dispersion leads to infinite weakness, so in the highest 
unity dwells infinite power.‖
171
  He also gives an argument from Aquinas to support the notion that 
―In infinite being is infinite power just as in finite being is finite power‖
172
 when God is the infinite 
entity. 
Ficino follows the Christian tradition that God does what he does through his own being.  ―For if the 
divine being itself were of insufficient strength to work through itself, but needed some deliberation 
that differed from its being, certainly the being of no other things would do anything through 
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  He points out that some powers are naturally innate in things and come forth without the 
thing‘s conscious choice, such as the heat of fire, the soul giving life to a body or the light shining 
from the sun.  Based on these natural analogies, he concludes that  
If action which is brought about by natural being is present in all 
things, but not the action brought about by choosing..., and if too the 
action brought about by being itself and nature always precedes the 
action brought about by choice and deliberation, then it is obvious 
that the action brought about by being is proper to the first and 
universal cause, which is God, in order that the prime universal 
action might be that of the prime universal agent.
174
 
God is portrayed as the prime mover, first cause and wellspring of everything, through only himself. 
Ficino elucidates how God‘s omnipotence is used by God, in connection with sharing his goodness 
with the worthy people, ―Because truly God makes all potently, wisely, in a spirit of good will thus it 
is fitting to restore those things so that he might reveal power, wisdom and benevolence.  What is 
more powerful, than to bring extremes into one person and to the highest infinite things?‖
175
 and 
given that God is the source of all God ―acts on everything but is never acted upon.‖
176
 
When referring to the various types of minds he says that ―Similarly, soul participates in mind, angel 
possesses the form of mind, but God is the all-effecting source of mind. … He is understanding 
existing in itself and of itself.‖
177
  It is important to note that minds and other things created by God 
are in some degree like God: 
It is reasonable to suppose that the all-powerful Creator of the 
universe had the capacity, the knowledge and the will to render His 
work as most like Himself as possible.  He has created it most like 
Himself in that He has taken the pure minds, which of all things are 
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most like Himself, and has exalted and extended them over and 
above the forms that are combined with matter by an immeasurable 
space (if I may call it such).
178
 
Ficino believes that God is eternal and omnipotence is one reason for this is: ―The stronger the power 
by which anything endures and is preserved, the longer that thing lasts.  If this is so, then God by his 
infinite power endures Himself and preserves all other things to infinity.‖
179
 
Ficino argues that God has the power to create anything, so long as there is no contradiction 
(following the Peripatetic tradition) and he believes that God makes only some of the things that are 
in his power to make.  He states that finite and infinite entities are subject to divine power as long as 
they do not include a contradiction.  This proviso is important because ―God makes, and does not 
make, only some of the things in His power to make, that He does such by the free choice of His will, 
and not by any necessity of either His nature, His understanding or His will.‖
180
  Given that God has 
free will to choose what is made and what is not, in a way, if man is in God‘s image, then man too 
should have free will.  And this is just what Ficino argues for, but with the constraint of ‗order‘. 
Lest someone think perhaps that the divine will, whenever it looks to 
created things, imposes its power on individuals, we should recall 
that the will of God puts the good of the whole before the apparent 
advantage of any particular small part.  For in the whole the image of 
the divine goodness shines out the more clearly...  But God not only 
wills things themselves to exist, He also wills the ways of being 
which are required for them consequently.  Since some things, 
however, by way of their own nature are meant to be contingent one 
might say, God chooses, as some theologians put it, for something to 
happen, as it were, contingently.  But nothing strays so far off track 




The real-world example he uses is of an army, where a general commands the troops and they are all 
working for a common goal, yet the individuals each have to choose and do their individual duty (and 
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hopefully they do it well).  Ficino also references Plato‘s Republic (book 10), Statesman and Critias 
to explain 
that providence does not impair the freedom of our will to choose, 
but rather serves that freedom... because God makes not so much by 
knowing as by willing, otherwise He would have made and would 
make all things simultaneously, and additionally would make bad 
things.  Again, just as all future events are written down in God‘s 
foreknowledge, so too are the causes of those events and their modes 
of action.  Just as our deeds are known to God, so too is our will 




When our immortal soul recognizes that it is the likeness of God, we recognize God: ―It happens in 
you as the true likeness of God, truly you recognize God, when you approve this to be the eternal 
truth itself and true eternity.‖
183
 
The author has not yet found any discussions by Ficino about the paradoxes of God‘s omnipotence, 
such as whether or not God can stop being omnipotent, God can create another omnipotent being, or 
God can create a stone that is too heavy for God himself to move.  Ficino‘s formulation of God has 
the attributes of existence, simplicity, goodness, omniscience, and omnipotence.  All of God‘s 
attributes are forever and in the highest degree.  These attributions are no different from those 
espoused by his predecessors such as Augustine and Aquinas.  The most identifiable difference is 
Ficino‘s belief in individual free will as opposed to Augustine‘s belief that fate influenced a person‘s 
choices. 
Given the Christian belief that God is All, and that humans are created as a likeness thereof (and that 
no other creature or thing was given such a privilege), humans therefore have a sense of dignity and 
duty accorded to no other.  Humanity‘s uniqueness requires them to strive to have their soul return to 
God, to be one with whom they came from. 
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Ficino on the Reasons for the Divine/Human Relationship 
If humans are truly an image of God, this implies a relationship between humans and God.  In a 
Christian context, the relationship begins with God creating humankind.  When Ficino uses Genesis 
1:26-27
184
 in De Christiana religione, he shortens it to ―God has said ‗We make man according to 
our image and likeness‘, and he [Moses] supplies, ‗God made man‘.‖
185
  For Ficino, the 
relationship between humans and the divine is a cycle unique to the human creatures, involving 
divine illumination, hierarchies, and love.  The notion of a cyclical relationship between humans and 
God is used continuously by Ficino throughout his career.  After Ficino translated Plato‘s works, the 
concept of this cycle also resonates in his commentaries on the Timaeus, Parmenides and Symposium.  
For example, in his Compendium on the Timaeus, he says 
But since there is a double order of creation in relation to God – that 
whereby all things come forth from Him and that whereby all things 
that come forth are turned back to Him – Plato is following the order 
whereby things come forth, when he says, ‗God placed the intellect 
within the soul, and the soul within the body.‘  But he is thinking of 
the return process when he says, ‗God spread out the soul, which had 
been placed in the mean position, to fill the whole, and in the 
meantime brought forth something of it outside the world, so that, 
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In his more religious writings, one finds it in De raptu Pauli
187
 and De Christiana religione
188
 and 
later several times in the Platonic Theology.
189
  Later in his career Ficino also translated works of 
Plotinus and Dionysius, where again, God relates to humans in certain cyclical ways. 
4.1 The Uniqueness of the Relationship 
Ficino believes that religion is unique to and innate in humans. 
Beasts display no sign of religion as it is unique to us.  Just as the 
lifting up of the mind to God, the king of heaven, is proper to us as 
the lifting up of the body toward heaven [i.e. walking erect] is proper 
to us and thus divine worship is almost as natural to men as neighing 
[is] to horses or barking [is] to dogs.
190
 
In this one sentence he captures the notions of elevation and erectness in the human species.  It 
situates humans in both the abstract/eternal (mind elevated to God) and the physical/temporal 
(walking upright).  Ficino likewise reads into Plato‘s Timaeus a Christian gloss, when he says ―the 
gods are enjoined by their Father to ennoble man, the lord of all creatures, whom He wishes to be pre-
eminent and to be in His image and likeness.  ... that, of all the creatures on earth, man alone would 
honour justice and the gods, so that it is in full accord with reason for the gods to have carefully 
nurtured the birth of man.‖
 191
 
The ancient Greeks had very different ideas about their gods, as compared to Renaissance 
Catholicism.  Ficino ascribes to Plato the idea of a single god in a variety of relationships with 
humans, but without any true philosophical reasoning.  He uses only an appeal to the implied 
authority of Plato. 
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Our Plato in Protagoras,
192
 wants the greatest indication of our 
divinity to be that we alone on earth, as participants of the divine lot, 
recognize God on account of a certain affinity and we desire [God], 
as we call upon him as progenitor {author} and we love [him] as the 
Father, as we adore as the king, and we fear [God] as the Lord.
193
 
For the ancient Greeks and Ficino, God is perceived as a dynamic entity, hence individual persons 
must also be active.  For the soul to be able to ascend to God, humans must work, worship and live in 
the right way to become like God. 
The civil and purifying virtues of the purified soul: they cause you 
not to know whether you are in the body or outside the body.
194
  
After having been formed by these [virtues of the soul], at last you 
will attain the exemplary virtues, which are nothing other than God.  
Drawn by the spirit of the Lord from clarity into clarity, you will see 
the nature of virtue advance in these three types gradually more and 
more.  Indeed you will recognize that this could not happen except 
by certain nearer and again nearer access to that divine and highest 




As previously seen in §3.2 in an argument on God‘s simplicity, Ficino also argues that the 
relationship is a union between God and humankind.  ―Similarly if he [God] were joining himself 
with those ones which are below us, surely the infinite unity has exceedingly united his very many 
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works reciprocally and to himself, since from the beginning he has included all in humans, then he 
will have closely united humankind to himself.‖
196
 
In chapter 17 ‗What Kind of Union may be that of God and Humankind‘ of De Christiana religione 
Ficino says that humans and God may have the same sort of nature, but the important difference is in 
quality. 
Because the union of God to man occurred according to the divine 
person rather than according to the divine nature, so when the word 
is united to man, it is not fitting that the father and spirit be united to 
man who, although they agree in nature, yet they differ between 
themselves by the individuality of person.
197
 
Interestingly, he also feels that the human/divine relationship is one of equals: 
Hence because God has connected himself to humans without an 
intermediary, we ought to remember, our happiness is situated in 
him, in order that we stick to God without an intermediary; and 
because friendship is between equals, provided that you consider 
God in a certain way made himself to be equal to humans.
198
 
The relationship between God and humans is reciprocal, both must participate.  God creates and loves 
the people, the people give God their gratitude and God then gives them a future life: 
Religion is also true by reason of the common prophesy of men, 
insomuch as all [people] everywhere always worship God, for the 
sake of a future life.  Therefore the truth is God provides for us, and 
the other life will exist, supposing that only the most perfect species 
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of the animals [man] has that most true judgment, which to the 
greatest extent, it is natural to him of all [animals].
199
 
While humans as a species are the best of the mortal animals, this does not guarantee anything.  An 
individual must be a devoted and pious Christian, as well as an enlightened and moral human being. 
Nothing displeases God more than to be scorned, nothing pleases 
[God] more than to be adored, he punishes more lightly the humans, 
the transgressors of some part of the divine laws....  He [God] prefers 
to be worshipped in any manner, even unsuitably, in a humanly 
manner, than not to be worshipped at all through arrogance. ...  
Therefore they, and indeed they alone worship God sincerely above 
others by action, goodness, by true speech, by a clarity of mind by 
which they are able and by a clarity
200
 {love of God} by which they 
ought, they venerate attentively.
201
 
Ficino‘s God is one who is active, and so too must mankind be.  For example, if a relationship is to be 
successful, the relationship by nature requires a dynamic of some kind between the parties of the said 
relationship.  A person must be an active participant in the relationship, yet God plays a role in 
guiding the human mind: 
The human mind is excited about God daily, the heart burns with 
God, the chest sighs for God, the tongue sings the same, and also the 
head, hands and knees honour [God], the arts of men refer back to 
the same [God].  If God does not hear these, he is ignorant, if he does 
not listen, he is ungrateful; [he is] entirely cruel if he compels us to 
utter a loud cry daily, whom he hears not.  But God, who is infinite 
wisdom, goodness [and] clarity, is not able to be ignorant, ungrateful 
or cruel.  But since the superior mind entirely comprehends the 
inferior mind, rather than the converse, if the human mind reaches 
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the divine mind, it is necessary [that] the human [mind] be 
comprehended and guided by the divine mind.
202
 
As hinted at above, God recognizes individuals, but individuals act independent of God. 
Since every agent acts in accordance with its own nature, any 
product made directly from itself, in that it is produced immediately 




Given that God has created humankind as the most perfect species and in his image, it is also 
important to recognize that religion was given to people by God so that they might know God.  In 
Ficino‘s view, ―Moreover the natural and common belief about God has been inserted into us by God, 
the common origin, and chief of natures.‖
204
  The mechanism for the knowledge to flow from God to 
humans is divine illumination. 
4.2 Divine Illumination  
Ficino's abundance of references to light and the use of light to illustrate concepts, points, dogma, etc. 
rely on divine illumination; the concept is essential to his philosophical system.  This section 
examines Ficino's use of divine illumination, with respect to religious and philosophical ideas, and 
demonstrates how his illuminist ideas provide the underlying methodology or mechanism to connect 
his formulations of the image of God, the cycle of love, and the situating of humankind.  For a 
Christian theologian, light is almost the perfect choice for use in metaphors arguing for Christian 
doctrine.  What better than God's first creation to bolster one's arguments.  What better to use from 
the ancients than their similar functions and purposes of light? 
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In Plato‘s Republic, Socrates does not speak of the Good directly, but examines the Sun, Eye and 
Light in Book VI as one of the ‗offspring of the good.‘  The role of the sun is of primary importance 
to all that follows: ―Plato chose the Sun as the first of the symbols … because it was a natural visible 
counterpart of the invisible and was usefully molded by Greek tradition with a nature and character 
capable of expressing the immanent, yet transcendent, status of Being in the world of Becoming.‖
205
  
Ficino too sees the sun in this way and finds it to be a good method for giving Christian scripture a 
Platonic justification through metaphor. 
To demonstrate God‘s presence in the physical world, Ficino relates the Sun, the light of the Sun and 
the shadow of God. 
What then is the light of the sun?  It is the shadow of God.  So what 
is God?  God is the sun of the sun; the light of the sun is God in the 
physical world, and God is the light of the sun above the 
intelligences of the angels.  My shadow is such, O soul, that it is the 
most beautiful of all physical things.  What do you suppose is the 
nature of my light?  If this is the glory of my shadow, how much 
greater is the glory of my light?  Do you love the light everywhere 
above all else?  Indeed, do you love the light alone?  Love only me, 
O soul, alone the infinite light; love me, the light, boundlessly, I say; 
then you will shine and be infinitely delighted.
206
 
He even conveys these ideas to his family.  In an August 1455 letter to some of his siblings he writes 
about a hierarchy, God being like the sun radiating goodness to all and the innate love that directs all 
lower things in the hierarchy to return to God.
207
 
The relationship is a cycle that begins with God, flows down through some hierarchies to man and 
then back up to God.  The downward flow has been called divine illumination and in some cases 
emanation theory.  The divine being represented by the sun was not a new idea and had many ancient 
sources which Ficino worked to unite with Christian theology. 
                                                     
205
 Notopoulos, p. 223 
206
 Ficino, 1975, p. 38 
207
 Kristeller, 1937b, p. 111 
 
 66 
In his commentary on Plato‘s Phaedrus, Ficino draws in other Platonic works to clarify what light is 
and how it delivers unseen benefits from God. 
Moreover, the light that flows out of the Good through intellects and 
through intelligibles Plato calls in the Republic the truth.  As the 
Philebus says, we cannot gaze on this, the Good‘s light and nature, 
with a simple glance: we divide it among ourselves by our particular 
condition.  So we call this light good insofar as it proceeds from the 
Good itself as something desirable and leads intelligences back to the 
Good.  We call it wise too for the reason it is the cause that other 
things are known and know.  And we call it beautiful, finally, 
because it fills knowers and things known alike with a marvelous 
splendor and establishes them with grace.  Here Plato calls this 
beautiful [light] the clearest light for the reason we mentioned.  In 
the Symposium he calls it, in addition, soft, delicate, and charming, 
as it delights those contemplating it in wonderful ways.  Both there 
and here he adds that it is lovable too, since it is the cause of love, 
and with absolute grace and wonder it summons those contemplating 
it to itself with utmost effectiveness and gentleness alike.
208
 
The concept of light emanating from a higher cause appears a number of times in Plato‘s works and 
undoubtedly influenced later philosophers and theologians. 
Plotinus used a theory of emanation to explain his version of the chain of being.  His ‗One‘ was a 
triune entity (One, Divine Mind, and All-Soul), much like the Christian trinity.  Similar to Plato, 
Plotinus believed that a higher level in the ontological hierarchy was the cause of the next level down, 
and that perfection was diluted more and more with each successively lower level.  This causal 
emanation also taught that all things flow from the One and all below it strive to rejoin and remain 
with it.  The concept of emanation comes from The Enneads (which Ficino translated from Greek to 
Latin), and the notion that the soul has its own light is described by Plotinus in this way: 
The life in the Divine Intellect is also an Act: it is the primal light 
outlamping to itself primarily, its own torch; lightgiver and lit at 
once; the authentic intellectual object, knowing at once and known, 
seen to itself and needing no other than itself to see by, self-sufficing 
to the vision, since what it sees it is; known to us by the very same 
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light, our knowledge of it attained through itself, for from nowhere 
else could we find the means of telling of it.  By its nature, its self-
vision is the clearer but, using it as our medium, we too may come to 
see by it.  In the strength of such considerations we lead up our own 
Soul to the Divine, so that it poses itself as an image of that Being, 
its life becoming an imprint and a likeness of the Highest, its every 
act of thought making it over into the divine and the Intellectual.
209
 
Plotinus, in an argument akin to Plato‘s, describes sun and light as an analogy of how something 
moves from the One down to the next level of the second hypostasis (i.e., the intelligible world): 
Given this immobility in the Supreme, it can neither have yielded 
assent nor uttered decree nor stirred in any way towards the existence 
of a secondary.  What happened, then?  What are we to conceive as 
rising in the neighbourhood of that immobility?  It must be a 
circumradiation – produced from the Supreme but from the Supreme 
unfaltering – and may be compared to the brilliant light encircling 
the sun and ceaselessly generated from that unchanging substance.  
All existences, as long as they retain their character, produce – about 
themselves, from their essence, in virtue of the power which must be 
in them – some necessary, outward-facing hypostasis continuously 
attached to them and representing in image the engendering 
archetypes: thus fire gives out its heat; snow is cold not merely to 
itself; fragrant substances are a notable instance; for, as long as they 




Heat emanates from its source, the fire and without the fire, there is no heat.  Plotinus presents an 
argument about fire giving off heat.  Without the fire, there would be no heat (likewise with snow and 
cold)
 211
 similar to Plato‘s argument in the Phaedo 106a-b.  Similarly Dionysius the Areopagite wrote 
that ―God himself is really the source of illumination for those who are illuminated, for he is truly and 
really Light itself.  He is the Cause of being and of seeing.‖
212
  He also has a discussion on the sun 
representing God in The Divine Names.
213
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For Ficino, the sun is the visible symbol of God.  In De sole, Chapter 9 enumerates why the sun is the 
image of God as he compares the sun and God.  He cleverly uses Platonist, neoplatonist and Christian 
writers to argue his case.  A number of his letters cover the same topic.  For example, among the letter 
titles are: ‗A Comparison of the Sun to God,‘
214
 ‗It is not required to honour the Sun,‘
215
 and ‗The 
sun‘s image is the vicar of God.‘
216
  In his commentary to St. Paul‘s letters, Ficino titled Chapter 6 
‗Against the pagans, [how they were] unpleasant and failed in their duty to God, and how they have 
recognized God by the Divine Light.‘
217
  Here, divine illumination is the knowledge of God, a form of 
revelation and a tool for conversion. 
Even though humans can work at receiving God‘s light, God‘s light is always greater than what the 
human mind can perceive and receive: 
The mind sees that God is not at all able to be seen in himself 
because of his excessive brilliance.  Moreover you never 
comprehend God Himself in himself because the third heaven 
remains for you, in which I myself saw those hidden things which 
man may not speak of.  You perceive the light of the sun in the 
elements and you look up to it in the stars.  You are not able to 
contemplate it in itself and yet, if you are wise, you are satisfied that 
your sun is so great that it surpasses the capacity of your eyes.  
Similarly you recognize the divine light in things created by him, and 




Ficino believes that the human soul requires God‘s assistance, in the form of divine illumination, to 
achieve union with God.   This argument is based on the perceived authority of Xystus the 
Pythagorean who is thought to have said that the human soul, being filled with God, has been raised 
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to God and is illuminated by the divine light that permits to soul to recognize God.  However, the soul 
cannot achieve such heights alone. It needs strength from above to be elevated to the infinite.  Only 
with the divinely given strength may the soul be elevated and become God‘s temple, and this temple 
is eternal, never to be destroyed.
219
 
For Augustine, divine illumination was the non-sensory knowledge of eternal concepts that were 
made available to the human mind and soul by God.  Augustine did not leave a definition of divine 
illumination, so the preceding is the author‘s definition based on her understanding of it from The 
Teacher and the Confessions of Augustine.
220
  This definition implies the assumptions that one has 
faith in God: God is perfect; the human mind and soul are imperfect; that there is divine, eternal 
knowledge (not found in the corporeal world), and that humans are able to receive this special 
knowledge.  There is also the assumption that humans should strive to learn the eternal concepts, even 
though we are not immortal (for Augustine that term included body and soul).  Divine illumination 
was a core component of his theory of knowledge in the sense that he believed in order to 
understand.
221
  Ficino would concur that one must have faith and believe in God, humans are 
imperfect while God is perfect and immortal, humans should desire comprehension of the eternal 
knowledge, and that humans are mortal, but their souls are immortal. 
Augustine was well versed in the thought of Plato
222
 and Plotinus.  Two Platonic works in particular, 
the Meno and the Republic, along with The Enneads of Plotinus, seem to have provided the main 
impetus for Augustine's formulation of divine illumination.  In the Meno, a slave boy learns by 
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recollection.  Recollection incorporated Plato's hierarchy of knowledge types and his ontological 
chain of being, and Augustine used these concepts in The Teacher but presented them to form a 
theory of knowledge (i.e., illumination) where God was portrayed a kind of teacher for the human 
soul, showing the human soul this ‗light of knowledge‘.
223
  So far the author has not found any 
evidence that Ficino accepts the notion of learning by recollection, not surprising in view of his idea 
that the mind is a blank slate upon the soul‘s entry into the physical body.  He does, however, have a 
strong belief in divine illumination conveying knowledge from God to humans, much like Augustine 
does. 
Augustine found strong parallels between the idea of knowledge as an ascending process (Plato's cave 
story), Plotinus' causal emanation, and man's journey to happiness in God.
224
  Divine illumination was 
a primary method of travel for a person‘s many journeys to try to reach and understand God.  Time 
and time again, the human must return to divine illumination so that over time, a soul can move closer 
to achieving full happiness:  ―[A man] can't consult that light regarding the whole matter.  Yet he is 
prompted to do it part-by-part.‖
225
  For Ficino, divine illumination seems to be more about God 
revealing himself and Christ to humankind (descent), and expressing his love for humans.  It then 
motivates humans to desire God, thus prompting their love to ascend back to God.  For Ficino, the 
inspired prophets of the Old Testament received and shared divine knowledge from God about God 
himself and the coming of Christ.  From the New Testament, Ficino points to the apostles and their 
revelations about God and Christ‘s life and teachings.  In Ficino‘s interpretation, divine knowledge 
descends from God to the faithful humans, who in turn recognize and appreciate the love and 
knowledge.  The humans then give their love and praise to God.  As discussed earlier in this thesis, 
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Ficino believes this expression of religion is something that makes humans distinct in the animal 
kingdom.  Ficino draws together sun imagery, love and divine illumination in De raptu Pauli: 
From the Empyrean, the summit of this you will recognize 
immediately, because the entire heat is most salubrious, the vital 
light of God by means of whose extraordinary goodness so great and 
salubrious a fire there arises.  Most clearly you will see the divine 
light and the truth itself in that fire, that is, in love something most 
capable of living in the temple of the sun and, that the fire is able to 
both be born and flourish by the light.
 226
 
Ficino uses divine illumination differently from Augustine; Augustine‘s is an epistemological theory 
(theory of knowledge) - God‘s input in to humans - Ficino‘s emphasis is more ontological and at 
times an argument for God‘s very existence.  We find both in the following passage: 
However, where the eternal act and immense life flourishes there is 
the most absolute light of intelligence.  But where the everlasting act 
and immeasurable life thrives, there is the most perfect light of the 
intelligence.  Since intelligence is the perfection of life and the 
reflection of it into itself.  Therefore this life is the light of men, and 
it shines in the darkness.  But the darkness has not comprehended it.  
Indeed the daily light is pleasant to sound eyes, [and] to sickened 
[eyes] most annoying.  The kind ray of God reaches the good mind, 
and it is named the father and grace.  ...Through this true light, which 
illuminates all men coming into this world, only you have seen all 
things in God, and God himself.  Indeed whatever is in the most 
simple God, is God himself.  Therefore, that series of ideas, which 
you have understood in God, is the divine wisdom itself, which is the 
word of God, is with God, and is God himself, and through himself 
all things are made.  And therefore God himself is found in all, and 
all are discovered in him.
227
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The cycle of light is dynamic and allows the soul to ‗see‘ its immortality. 
And just as the light of the sun is invisible as it remains in the sun, so 
as it flows out from the sun into the colours it is visible, as it flows to 
the eye and the natural goes out of it, it becomes visual when from 
that place it flows back into the sun, then one is made seeing, thus 
the light of God insofar as it is collected absolutely in himself, is 
above intelligence.  Then insofar as it explains in itself the reasons of 
the things, it is intelligible.  Insofar as it poured in to the intellect, it 
becomes natural to itself, it results as intellective.  When it [light] 
truly rebounds into God himself, it is intelligent.  For this reason a 
certain cycle is effected here, wonderfully shining from the divine 
truth itself into the intellect, when from the intellect back into itself, 
God is the beginning and end of this cycle. The intellect is the 
middle.  If the first and farthest boundary of this circle is eternity, 
insofar as an eternity, surely the middle is eternal indeed because it 
partakes in the boundaries.
228
 
Divine illumination helps the relationship to function.  It communicates God‘s expectations for 
humans and what he does with and for us.  Divine illumination conveys what God is and is not 
(attributes), and what God does and does not do.  Divine illumination keeps the relationship going by 
giving humans more information to help them grow and better understand God. 
4.3 Hierarchy 
In discussing the cosmos, Ficino says that ―From this marvelous harmony of all the cosmic 
constituents it therefore happens that the movements of each belong to all, that the gifts of those that 
are higher pour down upon those that are subsequent, and that the prayers of the lower beings arise to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
editions of Opera Omnia] ipsum facta sunt omnia.  Ideo et ipse Deus reperitur in omnibus: et omnia 
inveniuntur in ipso.  
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  Humans are part of a hierarchy below God, but as he argues, we are the best of 
the beasts and therefore of the earthly species, hence, we are closest to God: 
But in fact, in order that we return to the proposition, man, the most 
perfect animal, is connected to the most perfect, that is, the divine, 
by means of that property [religion]; especially man is both made 
strong by that perfection and separated out from animals.  Again if 
man is the most perfect of the mortal animals, he is the most perfect 
of all on account that particular endowment [religion], as among 
these [animals] he has the characteristic himself, not shared with the 
other animals.  That [endowment] is religion.  Therefore through 
religion man is the most perfect [animal].
230
 
This argument was commonly found in religious ideas current in Ficino‘s day.  The argument runs: 
human are the only animal species with religion; religion is perfect; humans are the most perfect of 
animals; therefore humans are the most perfect animal. 
Even philosophy and the ascent to God are hierarchical: 
Since philosophy is defined by all men as love of wisdom … and 
wisdom is the contemplation of the divine, then certainly the purpose 
of philosophy is knowledge of the divine.  This our Plato testifies in 
the seventh book of The Republic, where he says that true philosophy 
is the ascent from the things which flow and rise and fall, to those 
which truly are, and always remain the same.  Therefore philosophy 
has as many parts and ministering powers as it has steps by which it 
is climbed from the very lowest level to the highest.  These steps are 
determined partly by the nature and partly by the diligence of men.
231
 
While all humans may have a relationship with God, some do a better job of it than others and, hence, 
get closer to or more like God than others.  Ficino, like pseudo-Dionysius, sees a hierarchy within the 
human species.  Pseudo-Dionysius makes his human hierarchy quite explicit in the Celestial 
Hierarchies when he says: 
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The revealing rank of principalities, archangels, and angels presides 
among themselves over the human hierarchies, in order that the 
uplifting and return toward God, and the communion and union, 
might occur according to proper order, and indeed so that the 
procession might be benignly given by God to all hierarchies and 
might arrive at each one in a shared way in sacred harmony.
232
 
Dionysius defines a hierarchy as 
[A] sacred order, a state of understanding and an activity 
approximating as closely as possible to the divine. And it is uplifted 
to the imitation of God in proportion to the enlightenments divinely 
given to it.‖
233
 ... If one talks then of hierarchy, what is meant is a 
certain perfect arrangement, an image of the beauty of God which 
sacredly works out the mysteries of its own enlightenment in the 
orders and levels of understanding of the hierarchy, and which is 
likened toward its own source as much as is permitted.  Indeed for 
every member of the hierarchy, perfection consists in this, that it is 
uplifted to imitate God as far as possible and, more wonderful still, 
that it becomes what scripture calls a ‗fellow workman for God‘ and 
a reflection of the workings of God.
234
 
Ficino is never quite as explicit as pseudo-Dionysius, yet in a letter to Count Giovanni Francesco 
Ippoliti, he proposes that philosophers are above regular men in the human hierarchy because 
―philosophy is defined by all men as love of wisdom ... and [as] wisdom is the contemplation of the 
divine, then certainly the purpose of philosophy is knowledge of the divine.‖  It follows that those 
pursuing God‘s gift of philosophy become more like God.  Included in the human hierarchy are the 
priests who also have an elevated status above the common person.  For Ficino, the most important 
job a human could do on earth was to be a good priest.  In a letter on ―The dignity of the priest‖ 
Ficino writes that 
after God nothing is more virtuous than a good angel, and nothing 
more pernicious than an evil one, so nothing on earth is fairer than an 
honourable priest, and nothing more disgraceful than a base one.  
The former is the salvation of religion and mankind, the latter their 
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destruction.  What is a real priest, but a soul dedicated to God?  A 
priest is a kind of temporal God, but God is priest eternal.
 235
 





).  In Ficino‘s five-level ontological hierarchy should ‗soul‘ be removed as 
the middle hierarchical level, given that the soul moves up and down amongst the other four levels?  
The author believes that the ‗soul‘ really should not be classified as its own hierarchical ‗level‘ in 
Ficino‘s ontology as the other four levels do not ‗move‘ or ‗visit‘ the other levels.  Ficino has 
confused a member of the hierarchy with a level of a hierarchy.  The differences can be enumerated 
as follows (Table 2): 
Table 2 Soul versus Hierarchy 
Soul Hierarchy 
1 soul multiple levels 
soul belongs to an individual each level can be partaken of by many souls 
moves stationary (a level doesn‘t move up or down) 
partakes of all other hierarchy levels a level does not partake of soul; a level does not 
partake of other levels 
 
By Dionysius‘ definition of hierarchy, a hierarchy is an ‗arrangement‘ not a moving, constantly re-
organizing entity.  The soul is like those angels ascending and descending the ladder to heaven (which 
is equivalent to a hierarchy).  We never find eternal immortal God in a physical body (Christ had to 
do that for God), and we never find a physical entity that is eternal – these levels do not mix.  In some 
ways, the soul sits on the fence of the divided line, and sometimes it falls off the fence to the 
abstract/eternal realm and other times it falls off the fence into the temporal/mortal realm.  As 
discussed earlier, due to the prominence of the medieval celestial hierarchy in Ficino‘s time, there 
were many examples of the soul‘s ascent and descent.  In the celestial hierarchy the souls are 
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ascending and descending the ladder between heaven and earth to change their hierarchical level, for 
example, ―The souls ascend and descend through the regions/zones of heaven.‖
238
  What motivates 
the soul to try to ascend the celestial hierarchy to God?  For Ficino, the answer is love motivates the 
soul. 
4.4 Love 
Ficino writes that ―The work emphasizes, in addition to the divinity of Man‘s soul, the personal 
relationship between Man and God …‖
239
 and in De Christiana religione he says 
They may revere themselves as divine and they may hope [that] they 
are able to ascend to God, since as it were the divine majesty deigned 
to descend to them.  May they love God with the whole heart, into 
whom they may be transformed, who on account of a remarkable 
love, he [God] has marvelously transformed himself into man.
240
 
 God‘s love is a key ingredient of the God/human relation as God made himself visible on earth 
through Christ.  The motivating force of the relationship is love for both God and humans.  Ficino's 
emphasis is on the individual person and his or her relationship with God.  Many passages in De 
Christiana religione examine the personal relationship between God and humans.  Early in the work, 
Ficino goes to great lengths to show that humans have a special relationship with God (unlike the 
other beasts on earth), why Christianity is better than the other religions, and then how all people can 
best fulfill their role on earth and participate in a loving relationship with God.  The only way to love 
God is non-physical, but religious love and philosophical love can fulfill the non-physical function. 
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In a ‗discussion‘ between St. Paul and Marsilio (assume Ficino), Marsilio asks Paul why he has been 
enraptured and so many others have not.  Paul answers that the relation between man and God must 
be one of love and describes how it works. 
He [God] seizes the one whom he loves more passionately, before 
the others.  Passionately he [God] loves the lover.  For that most kind 
seizer wishes nothing other from you than you be happily taken by 
him, unless you wish to be seized even moderately, but likewise you 
would will this at no time, unless God had willed [it] before.  Just as 
the Moon does not reflect into the Sun, unless kindled earlier by the 
Sun, so you do not love that lover, unless you have been inflamed by 
that very love, loving and affecting you.
241
 
For the soul to ascend to God, one must also have faith, hope and charity, and without charity, the 
ascent is not possible. 
Venus in that place will further give to you, so far as she will be able, 
what the others have not been able to fulfill.
242
  Venus is said to give 
common love to the common-people.  Indeed surely the angel 
increases the extraordinary love of God to exceptional men.  The 
love of God, I say, which flows from the triple celestial heave above 
as much into the third heaven and into its angel as into our soul.
243
 
Again we find the notion that not everyone is successful in their quest to return to God and this is 
often due to their inability to love God appropriately. 
For no one returns to heaven except those who have pleased the King 
of the Heavens. They please Him who love Him exceedingly.  
Certainly, to know Him truly in this life is completely impossible.  
But to love Him truly in what ever way He is known is both possible 
and easy.  Those who know God do not yet please Him unless they 
love Him when they know Him.  Those who know Him and love 
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Him are loved by God, not because they know him, but because they 
love Him. … Therefore what restores us to heaven is not knowledge 
of God but love.
244
 
When it comes to God‘s love, it trumps knowledge!  Ficino believes that our will enjoys God more 
than our intellect does.  His reasoning is as follows: 
Behold!  I see where in a certain way the intellect fails, the will 
succeeds.  Behold, the love of God enters, where knowledge is not 
able to enter entirely.  Indeed, you make out in the distance the 
infinite, although not most clearly.  You love this [God‘s love] most 
passionately [and] with this you are most vehemently glad.  Indeed, 
you see how much is visible to you and you love how much you see 
those things, and how much you by yourself, because he is 
exceedingly abundant, that [He] cannot be seen clearly, and this fact 
is especially helpful to you because even without any anxiety, even 
with satiety you enjoy the good, because since he is infinite, and he 
is infinitely sufficient for you, and he [God] delights infinitely.  In 
the present circumstances, if the intelligence discerns the immense 
light by a reason not entirely infinite, still it is affected by the 
immeasurable love and joy, while the infinite will enjoys the good.
245
 
Love is what makes the divine/human relationship go around. It overcomes the levels of the hierarchy 
and enables divine illumination. 
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It is possible to argue that Ficino, in fact, moved away some medieval traditions by showing that 
humans are in God‘s image in a positive way, the soul is able to ascend to God, and can have a 
positive relationship with God and the Good by living a Christian and philosophic life on earth.  In a 
very bold statement for his time, Ficino assigns philosophy the lofty responsibility of assisting the 
human soul to become more God-like. In one of his earlier letters, he states: 
We believe that the supreme bliss consists in a condition of the will 
which is delight in and love for divine wisdom.  That the soul, with 
the help of Philosophy, can one day become God, we conclude from 
this: with Philosophy as its guide, the soul gradually comes to 
comprehend with its intelligence the natures of all things, and 
entirely assumes their forms; also through its will it both delights in 
and governs particular forms, therefore, in a sense, it becomes all 
things.  Having become all things through this principle, step by step 
it is transformed into God, who is the fount and Lord of them all. 
God truly perfects everything both within and without.
246
 
In Chapter 2 we found that his lofty goals of reuniting philosophy and religion, and good philosophy 
bringing people back to the church, while admirable, were not philosophically rigorous by today‘s 
standards.  Ficino presents the arguments for consideration, as part of a greater whole that he wants 
his readers to examine and discern the value of.  Ficino translated both the Corpus Hermeticum and 
the works of Plato before writing his more religious works.  This made him the first to translate all of 
Plato‘s works into Latin since the advent of Christianity.  While others had tried to incorporate 
scholastic arguments into Christianity, Ficino found that Plato‘s ideas were more compatible and 
sought to incorporate these into his religious works and did so in such as way as to avoid censure by 
both the Pope and Inquisition.  By relating the ancient ideas to Christian tenets, Ficino sought to 
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demonstrate that Christianity had always existed and that while the ancients did not realize it, they in 
fact recognized some valuable religious truths.  Ficino believed that philosophy and religion had once 
coexisted and lists examples of persons who were both religious leaders and wise men (and in some 
cases healers too) to support his argument.  He felt it was time to overcome the rift between the two 
caused by scholasticism and impious priests, and that the Florentine intellectual community could be 
brought back to the church‘s fold by demonstrating the rationality of Christianity.  Ficino offered the 
readers of his time a way to understand how ancient philosophy could enrich their faith and help them 
to see the historical development of Christianity.  
Chapter 3 examined Ficino‘s image of God and the five main Godly attributes - existence, simplicity, 
goodness, omniscience and omnipotence.  We found that while some philosophical arguments were 
used, Ficino did not present any new arguments. His novel contribution was to use Platonic ideas that 
were new to the Renaissance period, such as attributing his description of God to the Platonists.  In 
section 3.1 when discussing the existence of God, Ficino uses arguments from affirmation and 
negation, a weak syllogism, an appeal to Aristotle‘s authority (God as prime mover) and argument by 
analogy.  There was no compelling reason for him to expend significant effort to prove God‘s 
existence as others before him had done.  Ficino thought it was innate for humans to believe in God, 
and that the human soul desired to return to God, so his efforts focused more on the sense in which 
God exists.  
In discussions about God‘s simplicity in section 3.2, he uses a scholastic-style argument to establish 
that the whole (God) is greater than the sum of the parts, and an appeal to the authority of the 
Platonists.  Ficino also develops arguments against Averroes, for the soul‘s immortality, and 
Mohammed‘s notions about the Trinity.  He differs from Aquinas, but is quite similar to Augustine in 
his efforts to show that the Trinity can be understood using reason.  Ficino follows the traditional 
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belief of his time that the beings of the Trinity are consubstantial.  Ficino argues that God is the 
infinitely-acting, single source who created the universe, and bases his argument on the Platonic 
forms.  A weak argument by analogy and a simple argument round out the types of arguments Ficino 
used in discussions of God‘s unity. 
In section 3.3 we examined Ficino discussions about God‘s goodness in the medieval context where 
good and being are synonymous, and this relies on Anselm‘s cosmological argument that goodness 
must have a first cause.  Ficino believes that the human desire for the good is innate and that life must 
be lived morally, religiously and philosophically in order to reach the ultimate good, God.  In his 
arguments, it is the Good in the Platonic sense that is often used.  In his discussion of why God 
contains no evil, Ficino draws in Plato‘s ‗architect of the world‘ to explain why there is nothing evil 
in God, only the supremely good.  There are no novel arguments put forth by Ficino in his discussions 
of God‘s goodness, however he does use some new Platonic premises to enhance the existing 
arguments.   
In a different approach, Ficino appeals to the authority of philosophy to explain God‘s omniscience in 
section 3.4.  He also identifies truth as a core component of God‘s omniscience as truth is timeless, 
cannot be false and is unchanging, just like God‘s knowledge.  When Ficino defines truth, it sounds 
as though he is defining a Platonic form.  His argument that truth is immortal and essential to God‘s 
omniscience is a philosophically weak argument.  Ficino also relies on the medieval notion of man as 
a microcosm where God is in man, and man is in God, to demonstrate God‘s omniscience.  While 
Ficino believes that God knows all, he maintains that all humans have true free will because God 
knows every human choice and that those choices are made freely by each human.   
In section 3.5 we find that Ficino invokes Plato‘s authority to prove that God‘s omnipotence does not 
interfere with human free will and this is quite different from Augustine who believed human fate 
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was predetermined by God, although Ficino is more in tune with the humanist notions of Florence in 
the 1400‘s.  When discussing God‘s omnipotence, Ficino uses the Thomistic argument about infinite 
being having infinite power and some nature-based analogies.  Following the Peripatetic tradition, 
Ficino draws on the traditional formulation that God can create anything as long as there is no 
contradiction.  Ficino‘s new contribution to the discussion on human free will is his referencing three 
works of Plato when explaining that providence serves human free will rather than impairing it. 
Chapter 4 discussed Ficino‘s notion that if the Christian religion is to be viable, it espouses a 
relationship between humans and God.  His God is not an impersonal God, but a personal God.  For 
Ficino this relationship is unique to humans (among the earthly animals) and functions with a cycle of 
love, hierarchies and divine illumination.  In section 4.1 we examine his view that religion is unique 
to humans because the other animals do not show any signs of religious behaviour.  Ficino argues that 
humans are more God-like because they have the same sort of nature as God, but one that differs in 
quality.  He argues that the value of following a Christian life is the promise of a better future life and 
that humans and God must both be active participants in the relationship.  Ficino often draws Platonic 
ideas into discussions about Christianity, and he also includes Christian ideas (such as ascribing to 
Plato the idea of a single god in relationships with many humans), in his commentaries on Platonic 
works. 
Section 4.2 finds Ficino arguing that, given that God is not corporeal, there must be a mechanism for 
God‘s knowledge to reach individual humans.  For Ficino, this is divine illumination.  Given that 
light was the first thing created by God (in the Christian tradition), it is an excellent metaphor to 
describe how divine knowledge and love can be conveyed to humans.  He often uses the Sun to 
represent God and makes numerous references to arguments from Plato, Plotinus and Dionysius.  He 
also argues based on the authority of Xystus, the Pythagorean, that the human soul cannot achieve a 
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reunion with God, unless God provides assistance via divine illumination.  While Augustine uses 
divine illumination in an epistemological way, Ficino‘s approach is ontological. 
Section 4.3 examines Ficino‘s use of hierarchy in his various discussions.  The Ptolemaic universe 
and Dionysian celestial hierarchy were the standard world perspectives of Ficino‘s time, therefore it is 
not surprising to find his religious writings referring to hierarchies in various contexts.  For Ficino, 
the celestial hierarchy is the mechanism for the soul to ascend on its way to achieving a reunion with 
God.  He appeals to Plato‘s and philosophy‘s authority to help explain the soul‘s ascent.  Ficino also 
argues that there is a hierarchy amongst humans where good priests are above the common person.  
One puzzle Ficino left for scholars is his use of hierarchies with different levels, including the five-
level ontological hierarchy, were soul is in the middle, but moves up and down the hierarchy.  Today, 
we would consider the use of the soul as a ‗level‘ in this manner to be inaccurate. Given that a soul is 
a member of the hierarchy that is singular and mobile, it is quite different from the levels of a 
hierarchy that are fixed and immobile.  Ficino‘s use of soul in this manner also contradicts pseudo- 
Dionysius‘ original notion of hierarchy. 
Section 4.4 briefly considers the role of love in the divine/human relationship.  The human soul 
ascends the celestial hierarchy, because as Ficino believes, love motivates the human/divine 
relationship and the soul has an innate desire to reunite with the infinite goodness.  The universe is a 
hierarchy and God‘s love flows down through the levels to all created things.  In addition to love, 
divine illumination may also flow down to some humans.  The cycle of love finds it descending from 
God, and returning to God from the humans, over and over again.  In Ficino‘s arguments about the 
role of love, we find arguments based on analogies and appeals to authority (especially St. Paul). 
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For Ficino, faith and scripture, plus reason and ancient writings were the way to reunite the Christian 
religion and philosophy.  He is inclusive of ancient and pagan sources in his formulation of an 
inclusive Christianity. 
Faith, as Aristotle is inclined, is the foundation of knowledge.  With 
only faith, as the Platonists approve, we approach God.  ‗I have 
believed,‘ David said, ‗and therefore I have spoken‘.  Therefore 
believing and approaching the font of truth and goodness, we will 
drink the wise and blessed life.
247
 
He starts with ancient and medieval ideas, and changes them slightly by giving them a Christian and 
philosophical gloss but Ficino wants no part of being original.  He often stresses that others have said 
‗it‘ before and only wishes to explain what the church approves of.  The impression is that he is 
conveying the ancient knowledge and providing ancient ‗philosophic‘ revelations (not his own 
‗discoveries‘) to the intelligensi and religious colleagues of his time.  History tells us that Ficino‘s 
dream of reuniting philosophy and religion has not yet happened, but his noble aspiration remains: 
[In the] Timaeus Plato asserts that philosophy is a gift of God, and 
nothing more excellent has ever been granted to us by God than this.  
For the good itself, which is God, could bestow nothing better on a 
man than a complete likeness of its own divinity, as near as possible. 
… Thus it comes about that philosophy is a gift, a likeness, and a 
most happy imitation of God.  If anyone is endowed with 
philosophy, then out of his likeness to God he will be the same in 
earth as He who is God in heaven.  For a philosopher is the 
intermediary between God and men; to God he is a man, to men 
God.  Through his truthfulness he is a friend of God, through his 
freedom he is possessor of himself, through his knowledge of 
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Appendix A: De raptu Pauli 
 
This transcription is based on Ficino‘s Epistolae 1495 Venice edition 
[pp. LXIIIr - LXIXv] with occasional reference to Opera Omnia, 
Basel, 1576 [Epistolarum Lib. II, starting page 697] and Opera 
Omnia, Paris 1641 [Epistolarum Lib. II, starting page 678].  The 
Epistolae, 1495 Venice edition is available online from the Herzog 
August Bibliothek, Germany, http://diglib.hab.de/inkunabeln/24-
3-rhet-1/start.htm.  This edition was selected because it was printed 
in Ficino‘s lifetime.  In addition, the Basel and Paris editions of 
Ficino‘s Opera Omnia are known to be corrupted (e.g., punctuation 
added) and contain many spelling errors.
249
 
For readability, abbreviations have been spelled out (e.g., ee is 
transcribed as esse and & becomes et] and spelling modernized (e.g. 
u becomes v when appropriate and i becomes j where appropriate).  
Some mid-sentence words have been capitalized where it appears 
that Ficino is referring to God or a stellar entity representing a god.  
The reader will find many colons in the text and the publisher has 
used them as we would use a comma today.  This transcription is 
intended to provide a useable text rather than a philologically 
rigorous edition.  
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De raptu Pauli 
Marsilii Ficini Florentini ad Ioannem Cavalcantem amicum unicum de raptu Pauli ad tertium 
coelum: et animi immortalitate. 
Non licet nobis, mi Ioannes, his temporibus ob epidimiae suspitionem una sicuti consuevimus 
familiariter in terra vitam agere.  Verum quid nam prohibet interim nos in coelo, ubi nulla pestis 
formido solicitat nos versari?  Ergo amice age iam refugiamus in coelum.  At inquies forsitan in quod 
nam et multis
250
 potissimum?  In illud certe cuius radiis inflammati tam diu in terra coelestem una 
vitam agimus.  Nunquid meministi Ioannes cum olim nobiscum in edibus tuis cenaret vir ille 
probatissimus Bernardus renerius
251
 noster qua de ra-/[f. LXIIIIv]ptu Pauli in tertium coelum 




inter Paulum et animam: quod ad Deum non ascenditur sine Deo: et de fide spe 
charitate. 
Marcus. Dic oro beatissime Paule si modo licet homini loqui quomodo in coelum ascenderis et cur in 
tertium. 
Paulus. Absit a nobis absit Marsili procul impietas tam superba: ut illuc ascendisse dixerimus.  Nolo 
enim me ipso in huiusmodi revelationibus gloriari. Gloria mea omnis solus ille rex gloriae Deus.  Non 
ego ascendi Marsili sed raptus sum in coelum.  Gravia elementa mundi alta non petunt nisi eleventur 
ab altis.  Incole
252
 terrae coelestes non scandunt gradus nisi coelestis Pater traxerit illos. 
Marcus. Doce obsecro et hoc Paule per illum qui te rapuit quos nam ille ex omnibus rapit 
potissimum.  
Paulus. An hoc ignoras: quod nemo potest quisquis vel rapit aliquid vel rapitur ignorare?  Rapit ille 
[prae
253
] caeteris quem amat ardentius.  Ardenter amat amantem.  Non vult benignissimus ille raptor 
abs te aliud quo foeliciter rapiaris ab ipso nisi ut vel mediocriter velis rapi: sed hoc quoque nunquam 
velles nisi ille antea voluisset.  Quemadmodum Luna non refulget in Solem nisi a Sole prius accensa: 
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sic ipsum non amas amorem
254
 nisi amore ipso te amante atque afficiente fuerit inflamatus: hunc 
rursus non invocas instar eccho nisi prius te vocantem: non apprehendis eum sicuti neque locum nisi 
compraehendentem.  Finita quidem ut plurimum capere potes etiam si ab illis non capiaris.  Infinitum 
vero capere nihil aliud est quam capi.  Et quemadmodum imago in speculo non respicit vultum nisi 
ipsam vultus aspiciat immo etiam quando haec vultum videtur aspicere: nihil hoc aliud est quam 
aspici hanc a vultu.  Rursus quemadmodum actio motusque non metiuntur nobis tempus nisi tempus 
haec ipsa revera dimetiatur: sic anima neque respicit Deum nisi ipsam prius aspicientem neque judicat 
nisi di judicantem.  
Marcus. Sed age o nimium dilecte Deo doce nos tercio; cur in tercium coelum maxime fueris 
elevatus:  ut invisibile illud videres quod et ubique est sicut in tercio. Ac si usquam est praecipue est 
potius in supraemo.  
Paulus. Non sic ha nimium terrestris homo non sic supercoelestia capiuntur.  Mitte secundi coeli 
argutias a Mercurio adinventas.  Mitte sexti leges conditas ut vultis ab Jove.  Mitte septimi 
philosophiam ut aiunt hominibus a Saturno donatam.  Non attingunt ista veritatem ipsam Mercurii 
Jovis Saturni procreatricem.  Vis solem attingere quarto currentem coelo in quo rex ille mundi suum 
posuit tabernaculum?  Eia scande coeli tercii dorsum quarto contiguum.  Venus illic tibi protinus quo 
ad
255
 ipsa poterit largietur quod alii praestare non potuerunt.  Dare dicitur Venus amorem vulgo 
vulgarem.  Auget certe enim angelus egregiam viris egregiis charitatem.  Charitatem inquam a triplici 
super coelesti coelo tam in celum tercium eiusque angelum quam in nostrum animum influentem.  
Hanc siquidem sanctus Dei spiritus primum Seraphinis inurit.  Il-/[f. LXIIIIr]li secundo principatibus 
principale huius mysterium obsequiumque iniungunt.  Hi terciam regentes speram accendunt ibi 
Veneris angelum.  Unde charitas insita nobis a Deo continue alitur adolescit atque perficitur.  Quid 
plura?  Vis ne dimissis ambagibus breniori tramite solis attingere solem.  Primum sit tibi coelum 
fides.  Qua firmiter credas hunc esse tibi in primis amandum a quo et tu hoc ipsum habes quod posses 
amare quicquid usquam ames et quae diliguntur id ipsum quod diligenda sint habent.  Secundum 
spes.  Per quam proculdubio expectes ardenter redamari ab illo: quem nisi ante amatus ab eo amare 
non posses.  Tercium charitas: quae te et sponte cogat et necessario alliciat caeteris omnino dimissis 
illum amplecti quo solo dimisso nihil possides: quem si possides solum nihil est ex omnibus quod 
dimiseris: sine cuius ulnis neque amplecti teipsum vales neque alia neque illum.  Hic ego o anima 
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nimium vagabunda hic solum praeciosissima Dei penetralia penetravi.  Quae nisi a patrefamilias 
aperiantur non videntur.  Non autem panditur domus omnipotentis olimpi nisi mentibus hoc ipsum 
fide quaerentibus spe petentibus charitate pulsantibus.  Charitas autem aliorum finis est omniumque 
perfectio: cuius igniculis quondam accensus helias igneo quodam curru raptus ad coelum fuit.  Cuius 
et ego flamis raptus sum ad coelum.  Denique hoc tibi maneat alta mente repostum.  Frigus a tenebris: 
tenebrae a morte dependent.  Calor autem a lumine: lumen dependet a vita.  Quapropter frigus ad 
tenebras tenebrae deducunt ad mortem.  Calor autem ad lumen lumen perducit ad vitam.  
 
Curru fidei spei charitatis species in tercium ascenditur coelum.  
Primo quidem per virtutes civiles purgatorias animique purgati. 
Trino autem hoc coelo quasi vehiculo quodam id est fide recta: spe firma ardentissima charitate: 
species percurres triplex coelum.  Ubi dulcem patrem patriamque revises. Unde ter quaterque id est 
septies foelix evades.  Primo quidem horum trium meritis tria quoque virtutum tibi genera divinitus 
donabuntur.  Civiles virtutes et purgatorie animi purgati.  Quae quidem faciant ut nescias utrum in 
corpore sis an extra corpus.  Quibus formatus exemplares denique virtutes attinges quae nihil aliud 
sunt quam Deus.  Videbis enim tractus a Domini spiritu a claritate in claritatem in tribus hisce 
generibus rationem virtutis magis gradatim magisque proficere.  Quod quidem fieri non posse 
cognosces nisi propinquiore quodam rursusque propinquiore accessu ad divinam ipsam summamque 
virtutis ideam: ut in eandem imaginem transformeris. 
 
Secundo in coelum itur tercium per regionem planetarum per coelum stelliferum per 
christallinum. 
Secundo per planetarum septem regionem quod coelum quasi primum vagumque est ad speram 
transibis octavam quod est ordinatissimum syderum firmamentum coelumque secundum.  Ab hoc 
quia motu gemino agitatur atque diverso ad christallinum id est perspicuum nitidumque te conferes 
quasi tercium quoddam coelum: cuius unus -/[f. LXVv] est motus et simplex.  Ibi  aquae quae super 
coelos sunt laudant nomen Domini.
256
  Ex huius vertice statim in empyreo quod totum ardor quidam 
est saluberrimus agnosces vitale illud Dei lumen: cuius exuberante bonitate tantus tanque saluber illic 
                                                     
256
 Daniel 3, 60 
 
 89 
ardor accenditur.  Planissimeque perspicies et divinum lumen veritatemque ipsam in ardore illo id est 
amore potissimum habitare tanquam in tabernaculo Solis: et ardorem illum lumine nasci atque vigere. 
 
Tertio tertium coelum scanditur per mundum visibilem per mundum phantasticum per mundum 
intelligibilem. 
Tertio totum mundi corpus tanquam coelum unum transibis oculis manifestum.  Atque ad eius 
imaginem phantasia depictam tanquam secundum coelum te conferes.  Deinde et universum corpus 
visibile et imaginem corporis phantasticam dimittens ad naturam ipsam qua necessario constat et 
rationem qua definitur intelligentia perges.  Quod tercium tibi erit in mente coelum super sensum et 
phantasiam. Hic subito intelligentiae tuae intelligentia divina subrutilat.  Quid enim aliud est ratio 
universi partiumque illius quam ars illa aeterna qua eum suus disposuit architectus?  Si enim a 
corporeo quodam artificio materiam relicto ordine subtrahas quod reliquum est mens est artificis tuae 
iam menti conspicua. 
 
Quarto tertium coelum petitur per spiritus inrationales
257
 rationales intellectuales. 
Quarto esto primum tibi coelum spiritus omnis infra tuum.  Secundum tuus spiritus sit ob rationis 
munus quo inrationalia iudicat quidem: sed ab eis non iudicatur illis longe praestantior.  Tertium 
angelus qui oculos quidam est lucidissimus: cui quidem nota momento stabili sunt: quae tu temporali 
quodam discursu aucuparis.  In angelo Deum continuo conspice: tanquam lumen in oculo lucido et in 
momento stabili aeternitatem. 
 
Quinto ad tertium transitur coelum per tres angelicas hierarchias. 
Quinto scito quemadmodum in te qui parvus es mundus tres sunt spiritus: naturalis in iecore: vitalis in 
corde: animalis in cerebro quo solo finitum percipis lumen: ita circa ampliorem hunc mundum tres 
esse spirituum exercitns
258
 divinorum quasi tres speras intelligibiles circa divinum centrum iugiter se 
volventes.  Sed alios regionem mundi Lunae subjectam praecipue gubernare. Alios coelestia regere. 
Alios super coeli verticem volitare. 
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Tenebrae lucidae: lux tenebrosa: lux mera. Novem angelorum chori. 
Volito et ego hac et illac ad votum aliis sublatus Seraphinorum.  Et si nihil usquam reperio extra 
immensum bonum quod universum et omnino intrinsecus imbuit et infinite extrinsecus ambit: tamen 
quicquid reperio quod non sit ipsum bonum video ex lucidis quibusdam tenebris et tenebrosa quadam 
luce componi.  Scio neque tenebras posse seipsas -/[f. LXVr] illuminare neque lucem a tenebris 
comprehensam ex seipsa lucere: alioquin se vigeret ac purissime plenissimeque luceret.  Lucere ergo 
eam animadverto ex ipsa luce in qua tenebrae non sunt ullae.  Ideoque quando lucet in tenebris 
tenebre ipsam non compraehendunt.  Hoc autem est absolutum ipsum in se bonum neque subjecti 
neque causae neque graduum neque loci neque temporis limitibus compraehensum.  Quoniam vero 
omnia naturali instinctu bonum appetunt tanquam finem: quo solo perficiantur concludo bonum idem 
esse principium a quo cuncta efficiantur.  Hoc cum ex sui
259
 gratia efficiat omnia et perficiat certe ad 
sui ipsius exemplar tanquam medium cuncta disponit.  Est ergo principium medium finisque 
cunctorum.  Et quia omnino indivisibile est in quolibet trium continentur et reliqua.  Finis autem 
actionis movet quodammodo principium ad agendum.  Principium movet exemplar operis atque 
formam.  Huc omnes beati spiritus assidue oculos mentis intendunt: singuli tria haec intuentur sed 
diversa ratione diversi.  Atque in his inspiciunt veras rerum omnium quae in universo sunt rationes.  
Seraphini finem ipsum proprius attentiusque quam reliqua contemplantur.  Cherubini in fine 
principium.  Throni in fine medium speculantur.  Dominationes autem ipsum principium.  Virtutes in 
principio finem.  Potestates medium in principio.  Principatus et si mirantur omnia tamen medium 
proprius et ut ita dicam libentius intuentur.  Archangeli in medio finem.  Angeli principium in medio 
contemplantur.  Foelices animae pro diversis piae vitae meritis morumque ad angelos diversos 
similitudine novem gradibus in spheris patriae novem sequuntur novem ordines angelorum.  Mitto 
libenter animas infoelices: quae infra lunam sub terra caligine ubi eas novies stix interfusa cohercet 
novem turbas malignorum spirituum comitantur. 
 
Dei lumen in ardore empyrei coeli refulget. 
Cum dimisi spiritus tenebrarum subito e summa lucentium spirituum specula lumen mihi corruscavit 
immensum.  Vidi illic Seraphinos amore ardentes immenso.  In ardore huiusmodi lumen infiniti boni 
infinitum mihi refulsit.  Saepe numero cogitaneram
260
 ante raptum si bonum ipsum est voluntatis 
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potius quam intellectus objectum sequi ut animus voluntatis flagrantia ipso bono fruatur magis quam 
intelligentiae claritate.  Agnovi illic statim raptus me vera cogitavisse: cum viderem non 
Cherubinorum scientiam imo charitatem Seraphinorum Deo esse quam proximam.  Merito cum omni 
natura sit ut appetatur: et appetibilis ipsius ratio ut sit bonum infinitum ipsum bonum proxime 
sequitur flagrantissimus amor subitoque consequitur. 
 
Sexto in tercium confugitur coelum per tres Trinitatis personas. 
Huc age me sequere sexto quantum potes: o mens proprie infiniti boni ipsius avida mens proprie 
infiniti filia boni.  Ha propera nec te pigeat nam potes o bona mens tantum quantum velis.  Ubi enim 
so-/[f. LXVIv]la voluntate proceditur et proficitur: ibi sequi nihil aliud est quam velle sequi.  Bono 
igitur animo esto.  Nempe si finis ad quem quodammodo sine fine moveris proprie est infinitum 
bonum necessario principium a quo proprie moveris est infinitum bonum.  Quod quidem cum ex 
seipso suique ipsius gratia sit omnium que origo: certe ex se et sui gratia movet omnia.  Praecipue 
vero ac proprie spiritum praecipue hoc ipsum et proprie appetentem.  Pater tuus usque adeo bonus 
quando non male id est non frustra tibi dedit ut naturaliter huiusmodi bonum usque adeo sequi velles 
dedit simul et ut assequi quandoque posses et consequi.  In rerum ordine sicut nosti bona sunt omnia.  
Praecipue quia pulchre utiliterque ordinata sunt: et bonum naturaliter appetunt.  Si cuncta bona in 
rerum ordine in una quadam communi boni natura conveniunt: in qua cuncta bona sunt unum bonum.  
Necessario penes rerum ordinatorem: unum bonum est cuncta bona.  Sana natura illa communis et 
una quae in multitudine omnium iacet et continetur ab omnibus ab una quadam emanat forma quae in 
seipsa super omnem multitudinem est et continet omnia.  Sed ultra progredere: si quod infra rerum 
ordinem cogitas dicis infinite malum cur non etiam quod supra rerum ordinem extat fateris infinite 
bonum: si ad bonum propagatio pertinet quo enim et quando quaelibet perfectiora sunt eo et tunc 
magis propagari videntur proculdubio penes infinitum bonum existit infinita propago.  Propago 
inquam intima.  Nihil enim infinitum revera existit extra ipsum.  Ibi est igitur pater et filius.  Penes 
patrem bonum infinite filiumque infinite bonum infinitus viget et amor.  Si quilibet trium eque 
infinitus est etiam aequales inter se sunt atque simillimi.  Si infinita natura atque plenitudo cum nihil 
relinquat extra se sui totumque penitus compraehendat non nisi unica esse potest.  Unica est 
substantia trium. Adde et simplicissima.  Si modo potentissima esse debeat ac tam potentia in unione 
consistat quam in divisione debilitas.  Iam igitur o anima trina et una spiritus unus intellectu voluntate 
memoria constans etherem una mecum unicum conscendisti coelumque trinum.  Intra coelum tria in 
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uno sole vidisti equalia inter se et similia.  Formam figuram atque lucem. Solemque in tribus his non 
triplicem sed unicum judicasti.  Supra coelum in una bonitatis ipsius natura propagantem invenisti ab 
aeterno propaginem et amorem.  Neque tres in his naturas sed unicam agnovisti in seipsa se iugiter 
propagantem plenissime similiterque amantem et quod hic divinitus aspexisti haud quaquam licet 
aliter unquam homini loqui quam tres personas unumque Deum. 
 
Septem circa animam septennarii. 
Septimo considera mecum o anima septem capitalibus sceleribus expurgata a septem malignis 
spiritibus: libera quam septem planetarum munera extrinsecus ornant ut foelix appareas: septem 
Spiritus sancti dona intrinsecus imbuunt; septem Angeli Dei thronum cir-/[f. LXVIr]cumdantes 
ducunt ut revera sis foelix considera mecum septima hac lucis die in qua revera quiesces hora scilicet 
diei septima qua clarissime perspicies: ut septies in ea luce sis beata quae indulgere tibi dum misera 




 mens tertium coelum attingit dum considerat Deum in creaturis. Creaturas in Deo 
Deum in seipso. 
Considera mecum unum trinumque supercoeleste coelum: videlicet primo Deum patrem tuum in 
rebus ab eo creatis.  Res deinde creatas in Deo.  Tertio Deum ipsum in semetipso.  In quod quidem 
tertium coelum optime raptus sum olim ut et ipse haud ulterius pessime raperet et quicunque in terris 
miserrime rapiuntur illuc mecum beatissime raperem. 
 
Trinitas creatoris in novem creaturarum trinitatibus reperitur. 
Divinam trinitatem in rebus cunctis agnosces dum in eis novem trinitates considerabis quas imitantur 
novem ordines angelorum.  In una scilicet coeli machina figuram lucemque et motum.  In quolibet 
spiritu supra coelum substantiam et vim et actionem.  In omni spirituum numero tres hierarchias: in 
qualibet hierarchia tres ordines in quovis composito sub coelo materiam formam virtutem.  In 
omnibus mensuram numerumque et pondus.  Rursus potentiam ordinem utilitatem.  Praeterea 
principium mediumque et finem.  In te ipsa memoriam: intelligentiam voluntatem.  In scientiis 
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naturalem rationalem moralemque facultatem.  In qualibet trinitate primum Dei potentiam patremque 
refert.  Secundum sapientiam et filium. Tertium amorem spiritumque benignum.  Sic invisibilia Dei 
per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. 
 
Definitio et divinitas animi. 
Hic dum in rebus tanquam divina Deum reperis reperis et teipsum.  Quippe si in corporibus iuvenis 
spiritum: in tenebris lucem: in malis bonum. In morte vitam: aeternitatem in tempore.  In rebus finitis 
infinitum memento te esse spiritum incorporeum: lucidum natura bonumque immortalem aeternae 
veritatis ac stabilitatis immensique boni capacem.  Huc usque primum sit tibi coelum e cuius vertice 
tam Deum quam te in rebus cunctis agnoveris.  
 
Quod res creatae in creatore reperiuntur per rationes ideasque divinas. 
Accede amabo ad secundum ut inde in Deo res omnes inspicias: cuncta Dei opera cernit in Deo: 
quisquis dispositionem formamque domus in patrefamilias.  Regni in rege artificii in artifice 
scientiarum in sapiente considerat: semper tamen huius memor quod quaecunque hi cum tempore et 
labore meditantur et agunt: aeterna veritas infinitaque illa virtus momento prout vult et facilime 
peragit praesertim cum et intelligere in Deo non aliud sit quam esse et agere non aliud sit quam velle. 
 
Sicut cuncte naturales formae in una materia: sic cuncte earum rationes in uno artifice 
congregantur. 
Sed ecce video communem quandam in mundi machina molem.  Intueor formas in mole diversas.  
Scio aliud esse formatam molem aliud -/[f. LXVIIv] formas esse formantes: et quia molem hanc 
tanquam fundamentum intelligo ordine quodam antecedere formas segrego mente hanc ab illis: 
eamque vel in abyssum dispergi vel colligi in punctum seorsum excogito.  Servo autem utcunque 
possum formas.  Sed in quo eas servo?  In una quadam communi cunctis essentia.  Cuncte enim 
communiter in eo quod sunt conveniunt.  In essentia inquam indivisibili formas prorsus indivisibiles.  
Iam enim dimensiones ab iis omnibus segregavimus.  Volo insuper ex qualibet rerum specie unam hic 
existere formam.  Et quemadmodum omnes naturales formae, quae participatione quadam tales sunt 





 per essentiam tales sunt: id est formarum rationes congregari volo et video in uno 
quodam fonte per se infinite agente.  
 
Deus est infinita vitarum vita lumenque luminum. 
Ubi actus est infinitus est et vita atque illa quidem poenitus
263
 infinita.  Siquidem vita est intimus et 
absolutus actus essentie.  In vita infinita nihil est quod non perfectissime iuvat
264
.  Quod ergo factum 
est ab eo ipsa vita erat.  Ubi autem perennis actus et vita viget immensa ibi absolutissima est 
intelligentiae lumen: siquidem intelligentia est absolutio vite reflexio quod eius in semetipsam.  Ergo 
vita haec est lux hominum.  Quae et in tenebris lucet.  Sed tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt.  
Diurnum lumen sanis quidem oculis est jocundum: egrotantibus molestissimum.  Radius Dei bone 
menti benignus advenit paterque et gratia nominatur.  Male autem rigidus judex est et furia:  Per hanc 
lucem veram quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum: modo vidisti res omnes in 
Deo ipsumque Deum.  Quicquid enim est in Deo simplicissimo est ipse Deus.  Illa igitur series 
idearum quam in Deo intellexisti divina ipsa sapientia est quae verbum Dei est apud Deum atque ipse 
Deus per quae
265
 ipsum facta sunt omnia.  Ideo et ipse Deus reperitur in omnibus: et omnia 
inveniuntur in ipso. 
 
Mens reperit aeternitatem suam in rationum idearumque eternitate. 
Invenisti et hoc tu modo immortalitatem tuam.  Quo enim pacto potuisses a mundi formis mortales 
conditiones secernere et rationes inde immortales concipere: in eternam Dei vitam intelligentiaque 
huiusmodi rationes redigere actuum illum cogitatione quodammodo ut ita dicam efficere effectorem: 
nisi ipsa immortalis esses eterneque Dei vitae et intelligentiae capax.  Diffidant ergo diffidant de sua 
immortalitate homines flagitiosissimi quorum animulae quaerentes vitam solum in regione mortis iam 
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Immortalitatis fiducia accepta ex gradibus contemplationis quatuor. 
Tu vero confide mecum coelestis anima quae dum apud Deum contemplaris veras creatarum rerum 
omnium eternitasque rationes quodammodo compraehendis cuiusque rationis eternitatem.  Eternitatis 
rationem.  Veritatem eternitatis.  Veritatis eternitatem. -/[f. LXVIIr] 
 
Gradus quatuor. 
Profecto rationis aeternitatem sentis quando iudicas speciei cuiusque rationem diffinitionemque adeo 
certam consistere ut aliter unquam se habere non possit.  Puta quod homo sit animal rationale: et quod 
circulus sit figura in seipsam conversa a cuius centro ad circumferentiam omnes rectae lineae ductae 
sunt aequales necessario semper fuit semperque erit verum.  Rationem aeternitatis intelligis: quando 
aeternitatis naturam ita definis.  Eternitas est nomentum
267
 sive punctum per se semper stabile: cuique 
neque
268
 antecedit punctum neque succedit ita mensura quietis ut motionis mensura est tempus.  
Eternitatis veritatem cognoscis quando probas in eo solum esse veram aeternitatem quod ex se et in 
seipso sine principio ac fine quiescit.  Veritatis cernis aeternitatem ubi argumentaris neque incoepisse 
unquam neque desinere veritatem.  Alioquin fuisset veritas ante seipsam foretque post seipsam.  
Nempe si coepisse dicatur quandoque ante ab aeterno verum fuit et non nisi per veritatem fuit verum 
veritatem ipsam quandoque fore.  Ac etiam desinere cogitetur: deinde in aeternum verum erit et non 
nisi per ipsam met veritatem erit verum veritatem aliquando extitisse. 
 
Immortalitas animi ex proportione ad immortalia. 
Attende anima sitibunda liquoris aeterni.  Memento te non possem
269
 aeternum omnino objectum 
attingere nisi tibi aliqua cum illo inesset proportio.  Ergo si non ab evo saltem vivis in evum.  Neque 
solum attingis cum aliqua esse aeterna et qualia sint argumentaris.  Sed etiam pro natura tua penetras 
quando intrinsecam illorum naturam quasi in suas quasdam partes viresque distinguis.  Imo etiam 
quodammodo compraehendere videris quando diffinis.  Mitto quod videri posset alicui si mens 
sempiternam comprehendit rationem: rationem illa esse majorem ideoque aeternam: satis esto si suo 
modo capit eam equalem saltem quodammodo esse oportere.  Sive autem iam aequalis sit natura sive 
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capiendo fiat aequalis tanquam a Deo rationum fonte ob mutuum quendam amorem iugiter dilatata 
sufficienter ostenditur mentem esse sempiternam Dominique
270
 animam ab initio quantum ad 
essentiam vitamque ut ita dicam parem aeternae rationi fecisse postquam quotidie quantum ad 
intelligentiam et amorem quoad fieri potest reddit aequalem.  Denique quaecunque vis capit aliquid 
pro natura sua capit et ad suam retrahit rationem.  Si ergo mortales esses nunquam aeterna in quantum 
aeterna sunt et sub aeternitatis ratione nunquam rationis aeternitatem aeternitatisque conciperes
271
 
rationem.  Sed sicut rubris oculis et amare linguae rubra et amara sunt singula ita mortali animo 
mortalia cuncta judicarentur.  Nunc vero tantum abest quod quae sempiterna sunt rite contemplando 
caduca putentur ut mens contemplatrix etiam a mortalibus singulisque conditiones mortalitatis 
secernat atque sub universali ratione percipiat.  Haec materia corruptioneque seperare
272
 nunquam 
posset nisi et ipsa multo longius esset ab iis seiuncta.  Capis ergo in coelo hoc secundo aeternitatem 
tuam quando hic rationis cuiusque aeternitatem pro viribus capis in Deo fonte rationum immenso. -/[f. 
LXVIIIv] 
 
Mens Deum in seipso videt ob nimium splendorem omnino videri non posse. 
Caeterum nunquid Deum ipsum in seipso compraehendis quod tertium tibi superest coelum: in quo 
illa ipse archana vidi quae non licet homini loqui lumen Solis perspicis in elementis suspicis et in 
stellis: in seipso non potes inspicere et tamen homo si sapis contentus es tantum esse Solem tuum ut 
capacitatem superet oculorum.  Divinam lucem similiter in rebus ab ea creatis agnoscis agnoscis et in 
rerum rationibus creatarum.  Sed absolutam in seipsa non substines.  Gaudes autem thesaurum tuum 
esse ut sit prorsus innumerabilis: innumerabilis inquam non quod tibi desit ars numerandi quae tibi 
illic est plenissima sed quod ille virtutis gradibus summum artis exsuperet.  Satis tamen numeravisse 
videris quando cunctis quae vel esse vel intelligi possunt dinumeratis recta computas ratione Deum 
ipsum tale nihli
273
 esse: et quando quomodo innumerabilis sit virtus intelligis.  Satis vides quando quo 
modo fit invisibilis vere vides.  Satis compraehendis cum quam sit incompraehensibilis 
compraehendis.  Nunquam enim clarius veritatem ipsam intelligis quam cum recte quo pacto super 
intelligentiam sit intelligis.  Ubi summa lux tibi summae tenebrae: summae quoque tenebrae lumen 
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summum.  Unde hoc nihil notius: nihil rursus ignotius, hoc nihil praesentius. Nihil absentius. Nihil 
magis visibile. Nihil visibile
274




Rectius de Deo loquimur negando et referendo quam affirmando. 
Verum quid ita in hoc coelo vides non potes loqui: hoc est absolute pronuntiare atque affirmare.  
Quotiens de Deo alia negas ita discurrens Deus neque est corpus ullum: neque corporis qualitas neque 
anima neque angelus neque si quid altius cogitetur vere negas.  Quotiens ad Deum alia refers ita 
comparans Deus principium est quia ab illo profluunt omnia Deus est finis quia ad illum omnia 
refluunt Deus vita et intelligentia est quoniam per illum vivunt animae ac mentes intelligunt vere 
quoque refers.  At si affirmaveris Deus ipse in se absolute hoc ipsum quod vel repperi vel cogitavi 
valde decipieris.  Quippe si major te est summus ille omnium auctor non potest id esse quod tua 
intelligentia circumscriptum cogitur esse terminus.  Si principiorum principium finiumque finis 




 contenta est hoc ipso quod bonum suum incompraehensibile sit. Neque esset 
contenta si compraehensibile esset. 
Quid ergo an contenta vivis anima: quod vitam tuam non penitus compraehendas finiasque quia sit 
infinita.  Imo scio te hoc ipso gaudere quod absque fine sit vita tua bonumque tuum.  Sufficit tibi ab 
incompraehensibili foeliciter compraehendi neque tibi aliquid nisi sit incompraehensibile sufficit.  
Quicquid enim aut veri aut boni offertur quod certos habeat gradus quamvis quam plurimos adhuc 
plures intellectu requiris et ulterius appetis voluntate.  Unde nusquam nisi in vero bonoque immenso 
potes quiescere neque finem nisi in infinito -/[f. LXVIIIr] potes facere.  Quippe quae a solo infinito 
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Voluntas Deo fruitur magis quam intellectus. 
Ecce video ubi quodammodo deficit intellectus sufficere voluntatem.  Penetrat ecce charitas: quo non 
potest omnino scientia penetrare.  Infinitatem
277
 quidem prospicis quamvis non clarissime.  Hanc 
ardentissime amas: hac gaudes vehementissime.  Vides tu quidem quantum est tibi visibile. Amas et 
quantum vides ipsa et quantum vides abs te quia nimis exuberat non posse plane videri et hoc ipsum 
te iuvat maxime quod sine ulla vel sollicitudine vel satietate fruaris bono: quod cum sit infinitum: et 
infinite tibi suppetit et infinite delectat.  Hic
278
 si non infinita omnino ratione discernit immensum 
intelligentia lumen: tamen immenso amore gaudioque afficitur dum fruitur bono infinito
279
 voluntas.  
Quae quidem si plena est ad quam pertinet esse contentam totus omnino contentus est animus. 
 
Mens immortalitatem suam metitur in objecto suo quod est sine mensura. 
Animus dum in tercio coelo exactius admodum quam in aliis quam immensus sit Deus ut ita loquar 
metitur simul quantum propria vita naturae temporisque cuiusque mensuram excedat agnoscit.  Neque 
enim infiniti imo infinitatis ipsius rationem attingeret animus: si vita eius finem esset aliquem 
habitura: neque objecto immenso magis quam terminatis contemplando delectaretur si in numero
280
 
esset naturalium temporaliumque formarum.  Quarum vires objectis non quidem maximis sed 
mediocribus solum eisque proportione quadam congruentibus oblectantur si vitae vis qualis est 
intelligentia et voluntas ultra quemlibet loci: temporis, gradus finem sibi oblatum sine fine 
intelligendo amandoque progreditur certe vita ipsa loci limitibus non constringitur certi temporis 
terminis non exceditur contrariae qualitatis gradibus non obruitur: determinati veri bonique praesentia 
non impletur. 
 
Coeleste lumen lumine coelesti perspicitur supercoeleste supercoelesti. 
Dic age quo lumine suspicis coeleste lumen?  Profecto coelesti.  Dic ergo quo lumine vidisti modo 
supercoeleste lumen: certe supercoelesti.
281
  Lux ita mundi sensibus manifesta una quaedam qualitas 
est: ergo diversa corpora non aliter eam capiunt quam per unam quandam naturam illis insitam et luci 
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convenientem.  Natura huiusmodi perspicuitas nominatur.  Quoniam vero perspicuitas in oculo est 
sensibili luci cognatior quam in caeteris hisce corporibus: est enim in eo perspicuitas sensualis 
iccirco
282
 lux postquam illi infusa est reflectitur quodammodo in seipsam: quando scilicet oculus 
sentit illam.  Ubi videtur oculus non solum a luce pati dum suscipit ipsam: verum etiam in eam 
quodammodo nonnihil agere suo modo iudicat eam. 
 
Anima immortalitatem suam videt quando videt radium intelligentiae infundi sibi a Deo atque 
in Deum reflecti. -/[f. LXIXv] 
Eadem ratione spiritale lumen unum quiddam est id est veritas ipsa.  Hoc spiritus diversi non capiunt 







 huic similior et propinquior inest fit ut ii spiritus non 
solum id capiant sed etiam judicent atque ita reflectantur in ipsum.  Ubi videtur lumen hoc spiritale 
intelligibileque: primo quidem intelligentiam influere se ipsum
286
 minime deserens.  Deinde refluere 
in seipsum intelligentiam non derelinquens.  Atque sicut Solis lumen prout in Sole manet est 
invisibile ut autem e Sole effluit in colores est visibile prout influit oculo eique naturale evadit sit 
visivum: quando inde refluit in Solem: tunc videns efficitur ita Dei lux quantum in ipso absolute se 
colligit est super intelligentiam.  Quantum inde in rerum se explicat rationes intelligibilis est.  
Quantum infusa intellectui ipsi sit naturalis evadit intellectiva.  Quando vero in ipsum Deum resilit est 
intelligens.  Quamobrem circulis
287
 quidam hic efficitur: mirifice lucens ab ipia
288
 divina veritate in 
intellectum ab intellectu rursus in ipsam circuli huius principium finisque est Deus. Intellectus est 
medium.  Si huius circuli primus ultimusque terminus est eternitas in quantum eternitas certe medium 
est eternum quod quidem est particeps terminorum.   Quo enim pacto splendor ab eternitate fluens in 
mentem.  Rursus in eternitatem inde reflueret per intelligentiam scilicet quae rapit objectum et per 
voluntatem quae transit in objectum rapiturque ab ipso nisi in mente vim suam eternitatemque 
servaret.  Qua ratione hunc mens suscipit eadem per ipsum agit.  Non enim potest praestantius per 
illum agere quam susceperit.  Agit vero per illum absoluto quodam eternoque modo quandoquidem 
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eius radiis supra locum et tempus erectis indivisibiles eternasque rerum rationes attingit atque in 
ipsam sese eternitatem miris modis insinuat. 
 
Mens est Dei speculum. 
O sagacissimum venatorem qui in profunda hac mundi silva occultissima Dei vestigia investigat et 
reperit.  O argutissimum racionacinatorem
289
 qui rationes rerum invenit in summa omnium ratione: o 
perspicacissimum rimatorem qui adita Dei penetrat quodammodo in eius ab ipso
290
 et ut summatim 
dicam in iis omnibus peragendis speculatur in se Deum velut in speculo.  Suspicit se in Deo velut in 
Sole: o speculum divinissimum divini Solis et radiis illustratum et flammis accensum.  Nempe ipsius 
veritatis radiis vera ubique discernit: ac in omnibus veris et super omnia ipsam.  Ipsius boni flamis 
bona omnia passim ardet et sitit: ac in omnibus bonis et super omnia ipsum. 
 
Corpora sunt umbrae Dei: animae vero Dei imagines immortales. 
Vides o mea mens vides esse te Dei speculum quando intelligentiae tuae radii in eum ab eo immissi 
resiliunt.  Si eius speculum es ut es absque dubio quandoquidem eum in te specularis teque in eo: 
sequitur ut quod ex Deo infra te vestigium quoddam dumtaxat est et umbra id in te imago Dei 
similitudoque sit expraessior: ut merito dictum sit ad ima-/[f. LXIXr]ginem similitudivemque
291
 Dei 
te esse creatam.  Umbra corpus intuenti distincte non repraesentat. Imago autem ad corperis
292
 
similitudinem expraessa refert expressius.  Mundi machina tanquam umbra Dei Deum tibi ipsum non 
monstrat nisi eius ad te redigas ordinem et examine tuo clarissimo discutias umbram.  Tunc demum in 
te tanquam imagine Dei mundus ex umbra fit imago.  Fit in te tanquam vera Dei similitudine vere 
agnoscis Deum quando probas hunc ipsam esse veritatem eternam veramque eternitatem.  Tempus 
autem eius esse umbram et temporalia umbratilia omnia.  Postquam vera es eternitatis imago super 
umbram et umbratilia quandoquidem quasi media horum haec scernis
293
 ab illa certe eterna es nullis 
aut loci limitibus aut certi temporis terminis circumscripta.  Alioquin non posses vel per immensum 
spacium tempusve cogitatione discurrere vel ultra haec ad indivisibilem eternamque transire naturam. 
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Mens quia est divini vultus imago Deum semper suspicere debet. 
O imago Dei in mentis speculo quamdiu es in enigmate id est umbra corporis cognoscis per 
speculum.  Sed extra umbram facie videbis ad faciem: o divini vultus imago in speculo vultum aspice 
tuum.   Quem adspicere nihil ferme aliud est quam aspici.  Quandoquidem oculi illius radius ipse est 
qui inspicit ipse est qui a seipso respicitur: cognosce teipsam mens aliarum rerum cognoscendarum 
usque adeo cupida quid es o mens cedo quid es?  Imago universi exemplaris exacta.  Legitima patris 
omnium filia.  Supercoelestis Solis radius sempiternus iugiter natura reflexus in Solem.  Deus ergo te 
libentissime tanquam suam imaginem intuetur.  Amat omnino te tanquam filiam.  Fulget tibi tanquam 
radio suo inngitque
294
 te sibi.  Ergo iam moribus et pietate ad exemplar compone te tuum quo 
integerrime reformaris.  Ama ante omnia patrem illo
295
 quo foeliciter generaris foelicius regeneraris.  
Gaude dumtaxat lumine sine quo neque aliis potes unquam neque te ipsa gaudere.  Terribiles ante 
omnia tenebre: quia et vita consistit in luce et lux in vita: et quo interiores eo terribiliores adveniunt.  
Horribiles extra corpus tenebre cunctis.  Horribiliores intra corpus sunt melancholicis.  Horribilissime 
in anima miseris.  Jocundum
296
 ergo aeris lumen omnibus quia vitali spiritui
297
 cognatissimum est 
rerumque innumerabilium varietate delectat et docet jocundius
298
 lumen in spiritibus corporis est 
sanguineis suavissimum lumen intimum mentis beatis. 
 
Deus ipsum gaudium. Per ipsum duntaxat gaudemus ipso solo beate gaudemus. 
Si omnia vitandi doloris et consequendi gaudii gratia omnes agunt et absque gaudio ipso vitam ipsam 
respuunt manifeste gaudium est finis omnium: est igitur et principium: quo enim moventur cuncta 
inde cuncta moventur et fiunt.  Quid ergo aliud est gaudium ipsum nisi Deus?  Bonorum bonum: 
gaudium gaudiorum.  Cum tantum his bonis gaudeas atque illis dicito mihi si modo dici potest 
quantum illo bono quantumve idea illa gaudii gaudeas sine cuius illecebris sine cuius forma neque his 
bonis gaudes neque -/[f. LXXv] illis.  Bono hoc et hac idea gaudent continue quicunque re aliqua 
gaudent vel ingrati.  Sed non bene beateque gaudent nisi grati quibus multo gratius hoc advenit quam 
ingratis.  Ergo si vis ipso bono ipsoque gaudio optime beatissimeque gaudere memento in omnibus 
quae tibi placent nihil tibi aliud placere quam ipsum.  FINIS. 
                                                     
294
 iungitque in 1576 
295
 illum in 1576 
296
 Jucundum in 1576 
297
 spiritus in 1576 
298




—. (2009; Downloaded March 2010). Bible, New Standard Revised Version (www.e-sword.net ed.). 
(R. Meyers, Ed.) e-Sword. 
Adamson, P. & Taylor, R. C. (Ed.). (2005). The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Adorno, F. et. al. (1999). The World of Renaissance Florence (6th Reprint ed.). (W. Darwell, Trans.) 
Florence, Italy: Giunti Gruppo Editoriale. 
Alighieri, D. (1949, 1955, 1962). The Divine Comedy. (D. L. Sayers, Trans.) Baltimore, MD, USA: 
Penguin Books. 
Allen, M. J. (1975). Marsilio Ficino: The Philebus Commentary. (M. J. Allen, Trans.) Los Angeles, 
CA, USA: University of California Press. 
—. (1977). Ficino's Lecture on the Good? Renaissance Quarterly , 30 (2), 160-171. 
—. (1982). Ficino's theory of the five substances and the Neoplatonists' Parmenides. The Journal of 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies , 12 (1), 19-44. 
—. (1984). Marsilio Ficino on Plato, The Neoplatonists and the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity. 
Renaissance Quarterly , 37 (4), 555-584. 
—. (1998). Synoptic Art. Florence, Italy: Leo S. Olschki Editore. 
Allen, M. J., Davies, M., & Rees, V. (Eds.). (2002). Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, 
His Legacy. NLD: Brill Academic Publishers. 
Anselm. (1998). Anselm of Canterbury The Major Works. (B. Davies, and G. R. Evans, Eds.) Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press. 
Augustine. (1953). Confessions (1966 ed., Vol. 21). (V. J. Burke, Trans.) Washington, USA: Catholic 
University Press of America. 
—. (1988). Tractates on the Gospel of John. Washington, DC, USA: Catholic University of America. 
—. (1995). Against the Academicians; The Teacher. Indianapolis, USA: Hacket Publishing Co. 
Brucker, G. A. (1990). Monasteries, Friaries, and Nunneries in Quattrocento Florence. In T. Verdon 
& J. Henderson, (Eds.), Christianity and the Renaissance, Image and Religious Imagination in 
the Quattrocento (pp. 41-62). Syracuse, NY, USA: Syracuse University Press. 
Bullard, M. M. (1990). Marsilio Ficino and the Medici. In T. Verdon & J. Henderson, (Eds.), 
Christianity and the Renaissance (pp. 467-492). Syracuse, NY, USA: Syracuse University Press. 
 
 103 
Burckhardt, J. The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy. (S. Middlemore, Trans.) Old Saybrook, 
CT, USA: Konecky & Konecky. 
Cassier, E. (1945). Ficino's Place in Intellectual History. Journal of the History of Ideas , 5 (4), 483-
501. 
Cesati, F. (1999). The Medici, Story of a European Dynasty. Florence, Italy: La Mandragora. 
Collins, A. B. (1974). The Secular is Sacred, Platonism and Thomism in Marsilio Ficino's Platonic 
Theology (Vol. 69 in the International Archives of the History of Ideas). The Hague, Netherlands: 
Martinus Hijhoff. 
Copenhaver, B. P. (1984). Scholastic Philosophy and Renaissance Magic in the De Vita of Marsilio 
Ficino. Renaissance Quarterly , 37 (4), 523-554. 
Davies, J. (1992). Marsilio Ficino: Lecturer at the Studio fiorentino. Renaissance Quarterly , 45 (4), 
785-790. 
Edelheit, A. (2008). Ficino, Pico and Savonarola, The Evolution of Humanist Theology 1461/2-1498 
(Vol. 78 The Medieval Mediteranean). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. 
Eusebius. (1981). Preparation for the Gospel (Reproduction of 1903 edition ed., Vol. 2). (E. H. 
Gifford, Trans.) Grand Rapids, MI, USA: Baker Book House. 
Ficino, M. (1495). Epistolae (Digital version: http://diglib.hab.de/inkunabeln/24-3-rhet-1/start; 
Accessed July 10, 2009 ed.). Venice, Italy: Anthony Koberger. 
—. (1576a). De christiana religione 
(http://bivio.signum.sns.it/bvWorkTOC.php?authorSign=FicinoMarsilio&titleSign= 
DeChristianaReligione; Accessed March 30, 2008 ed.). Basel: ex offficina Henricpetrina. 
—. (1576b). Opera Omnia ((1962 photographic reprint) ed.). Turin, Italy: Bottega d'Erasmo. 
—. (1641). Opera Omnia (http://www.bium.univ-paris5.fr/histmed/medica/cote?01177x01; Accessed 
December 16, 2009. ed.). Paris, France: Guillaume Pelé. 
—. (1967). Concerning the Sun. In A. B. Fallico and H. Shapiro, (Eds.), Renaissance Philosophy 
(Fallico &. Shapiro, Trans., Vol. 1, pp. 118-141). New York, NY, USA: Random House. 
—. (1975). The Letters of Marsilio Ficino (Volume 1) (1983 Reprint ed., Vol. 1). (Fellowship of the 
School of Economic Science, Trans.) London, UK: Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd. 
—. (1978). The Letters of Marsilio Ficino (Liber III) (1982 Reprint ed., Vol. 2). (Fellowship of the 
School of Economic Science, Trans.) London, UK: Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd. 
—. (1981). The Letters of Marsilio Ficino (Liber IV) (1994 Reprint ed., Vol. 3). (Fellowship of the 
School of Economic Science, Trans.) London, UK: Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd. 
 
 104 
—. (1985). Commentary on Plato's Symposium on Love. (S. Jayne, Trans.) Woodstock, CT, USA: 
Spring Publications. 
—. (1988). The Letters of Marsilio Ficino (Liber V) (Vol. 4). (Fellowship of the School of Economic 
Science, Trans.) London, UK: Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd. 
—. (1994). The Letters of Marsilio Ficino (Liber VI) (Vol. 5). (Fellowship of the School of Economic 
Science, Trans.) London, UK: Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd. 
—. (1996). Meditations on the Soul, Selected Letters of Marsilio Ficino. (S. o. Science, Trans.) 
Rochester, VT, USA: Inner Traditions International. 
—. (1998). Three Books on Life. (J. R. Clark. & C. V. Kaske, Trans.) Tempe, AZ, USA: Medieval & 
Renaissance Texts & Studies. 
—. (1999). The Letters of Marsilio Ficino (Liber VII) (Vol. 6). (Fellowship of the School of 
Economic Science, Trans.) London, UK: Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd. 
—. (2001). Platonic Theology, Books I-IV (Vol. 1). (M. J. Allen, Trans.) Cambridge, MA, USA: 
Harvard University Press. 
—. (2002). Platonic Theology, Books V-VIII (Vol. 2). (M. J. Allen, Trans.) Cambridge, MA, USA: 
Harvard University Press. 
—. (2003a). Platonic Theology, Books IX-XI (Vol. 3). (M. J. Allen, Trans.) Cambridge, MA, USA: 
Harvard University Press. 
—. (2003b). The Letters of Marsilio Ficino (Liber VIII) (Vol. 7). (Fellowship of the School of 
Economic Science, Trans.) London, UK: Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd. 
—. (2004). Platonic Theology, Books XII-XIV (Vol. 4). (M. J. Allen, Trans.) Cambridge, MA, USA: 
Harvard University Press. 
—. (2005). Platonic Theology, Books XV-XVI (Vol. 5). (M. J. Allen, Trans.) Cambridge, MA, USA: 
Harvard University Press. 
—. (2006a). Gardens of Philosophy, Ficino on Plato. (A. R. Farndell, Trans.) London, UK: 
Shepheard-Walwyn Ltd. 
—. (2006b). Platonic Theology, Books XVII-XVIII (Vol. 6). (M. J. Allen, Trans.) Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
—. (2008a). Commentaries on Plato, Phaedrus and Ion (Vol. 1). (M. J. Allen, Trans.) Cambridge, 
MA, USA: The I Tatti Renaissance Library. 
—. (2008b). Evermore Shall Be So, Ficino on Plato's Parmenides. (A. Farndell, Trans.) London, UK: 
Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd. 
 
 105 
—. (2009a). The Letters of Marsilio Ficino (Liber IX) (Vol. 8). (Fellowship of the School of 
Economic Science, Trans.) London, UK: Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd. 
—. (2009b). When Philosophers Rule, Ficino on Plato's Republic, Laws, & Epinomis. (A. Farndell, 
Trans.) London, UK: Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd. 
—. (2010). All Things Natural, Ficino on Plato's Timaeus. (A. Farndell, Trans.) London, UK: 
Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd. 
Field, A. (1988). The Origins of the Platonic Academy of Florence. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton 
University Press. 
Hankins, J. (1991a). Plato in the Italian Renaissance (2nd Edition ed., Vol. 2). New York: E. J. Brill. 
—. (1991b). The Myth of the Platonic Academy of Florence. Renaissance Quarterly , 44 (2). 
Hankins, J. (Ed.). (2007). The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hughes, G. J. (1995). The Nature of God. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. 
Kekewich, M. L. (2000). The Impact of Humanism. (L. Kekewich, Ed.) New Haven, CT, USA: Yale 
University Press for The Open University. 
Kristeller, P. O. (1937a). Supplementum Ficinanum. Florence, Italy: Leonis s. Olschki. 
—. (1937b). Supplementum Ficinianum II (Vol. 2). Florence, Italy: Leonis S. Olschki. 
—. (1939). Florentine Platonism and Its Relations with Humanism and Scholasticism. Church 
History , 8 (3). 
—. (1944a). Ficino and Pomponazzi on the Place of Man in the Universe. Journal of the History of 
Ideas , 5 (2). 
—. (1944b). The Scholastic Background of Marsilio Ficino, with an Edition of Unpublished Texts. (J. 
a. Quasten, Ed.) Traditio , II, 257-318. 
—. (1947). The Philosophy of Man in the Italian Renaissance. Italica , 24 (2). 
—. (1961). The Platonic Academy of Florence. Renaissance News , 14 (3). 
—. (1962). Studies on Renaissance Humanism During the Last Twenty Years. Studies in the 
Renaissance , 9, 7-30. 
—. (1964a). Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance. CA, USA: Stanford University Press. 




—. (1974). The Role of Religion in Renaissance Humanism and Platonism. In C. Trinkaus & H. 
Oberman, (Eds.), The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion (Vol. #10 
Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, pp. 367-370). Leiden, Netherlands: Brill. 
—. (1980). Renaissance Thought and the Arts (2nd Edition ed.). Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton 
University Press. 
—. (1983). Marsilio Ficino as a Man of Letters and the Glosses Attributed to Him in the Caetani 
Codex of Dante. Renaissance Quarterly , 36 (1), 1-47. 
—. (1987). Marsilio Ficino and His Work After Five Hundred Years. Florence, Italy: Leo S. Olschki 
Editore. 
Lackner, D. (2002). The Camaldolese Academy: Ambrogio Traversari, Marsilio Ficino and the 
Christian Platonic Tradition. In M. J. Allen & V. Rees with M. Davies, (Eds.), Marsilio Ficino: 
His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy (pp. 15-44). Boston, MA, USA: Brill. 
Lauster, J. (2002). Marsilio Ficino as a Christian Thinker: Theological aspects of his Platonism. In M. 
J. Allen & V. Rees with M. Davies, (Eds.), Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His 
Legacy (pp. 45-69). Boston, MA, USA: Brill. 
Lindberg, C. (2006). A Brief History of Christianity. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. 
Notopoulos, J. A. (1944). The Symbolism of the Sun and Light in the Republic of Plato. II. Classical 
Philology , 39 (4), 163-172. 
O'Rourke Boyle, M. (1999). Gracious Laughter: Marsilio Ficino's Anthropology. Renaissance 
Quarterly , 52 (3), 712-741. 
Pitti, B. a. (1967). Two Memoirs of Renaissance Florence. (G. A. Bruckner, Ed., & J. Martines, 
Trans.) New York, NY, USA: Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. 
Plato. (1994). Plato, Collected Dialogues (15th Printing ed.). (E. Hamilton, & H. Cairns, Eds.) 
Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. 
Plotinus. (1991). The Enneads (3rd ed.). (S. MacKenna, Trans.) New York, NY, USA: Penguin 
Group. 
Pseudo-Dionysius. (1987). Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works (Vol. The Classics of Western 
Spirituality). (C. Luibheid, Trans.) New York, NY, USA: Paulist Press. 
Rist, J. M. (1967). Plotinus, The Road to Reality (1977 reprint ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rubenstein, R. E. (2003). Aristotle's Children, How Christians, Muslims, and Jews Rediscovered 
Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Middle Ages. Orlando, FL, USA: Harcourt, Inc. 
 
 107 
Schevill, F. (1949). The Medici. New York, NY, USA: Konecky & Konecy. 
Schmidt-Biggemann, W. (2004). Philosophia perennis, Historical Outlines of Western Spirituality in 
Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought (Vol. #189 International Archives of the History of 
Ideas). Netherlands: Springer. 
Serracino-Inglott, P. (2002). Ficino the Priest. In M. J. Allen & V. Rees with M. Davies, (Eds.), 
Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy (pp. 1-13). Boston, MA, USA: Brill. 
Shepherd, M. (Ed.). (1999). Friend to Mankind, Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499). London, UK: 
Shepheard-Walwyn. 
Stelten, L. F. (1995). Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Latin (7th Printing, 2006 ed.). Peabody, MA, USA: 
Hendrickson Publishers Inc. 
Trinkaus, C. (1970). In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought 
(Vol. 2). Chicago, IL, USA: The University of Chicago. 
Trismegistus, H. (1992). Hermetica (2000 ed.). (B. P. Copenhaver, Trans.) Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Voss, A. (2006). Marsilio Ficino. (A. Voss, Trans.) Berkeley, CA, USA: North Atlantic Books. 
Walker, D. P. (2000). Spiritual & Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella (Reprint of 1958 
edition ed.). University Park, PA, USA: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Weissman, R. F. (1990). Sacred Eloquence, Humanist Preaching and Lay Piety in Renaissance 
Florence. In T. Verdon & J. Henderson, (Eds.), Christianity and the Renaissance, Image and 
Religious Imagination in the Quattrocento (pp. 250-271). Syracuse, NY, USA: Syracuse 
University Press. 
 
